The Japanese and Korean experiences in managing development (English) by SHINOHARA, M. et al.
SWP574
July 1983
The Japanese and Korean Experiences
in Managing Development
OPD LIBRARY
DateRer-d._
Miyohei Shinohara Categsry
Toru Yanagihara
Kwang Suk Kim
WORLD BANK STAFF WORKING PAPERS
Number 574
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SERIES
Number 1
FIE3 0t
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
WORLD BANK STAFF WORKING PAPERS e*. -_
Number 574
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SERIES
Number I
The Japanese and Korean Experiences
in Managing Development
Miyohei Shinohara
Toru Yanagihara
Kwang Suk Kim
Ramgopal Agarwala (editor)
The World Bank
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Copyright ®) 1983
The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development / THE WORLD BANK
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
I,irst printing July 1983
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
This is a working document published informally by the World Bank. To
present the results of research with the least possible delay, the typescript has
not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formal
printed texts, and the World Bank accepts no responsibility for errors. The
publication is supplied at a token charge to defray part of the cost of
manufacture and distribution.
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the author(s) and
should not be attributed to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to
any individual acting on their behalf. Any maps used have been prepared
solely for the convenience of the readers; the denominations used and the
boundaries shown do not imply, on the part of the World Bank and its affiliates,
any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or
acceptance of such boundaries.
The full range of World Bank publications is described in the Catalog of World
Bank Publications; the continuing research program of the Bank is outlined in
World Bank Research Program: Abstracts of Current Studies. Both booklets are
updated annually; the most recent edition of each is available without charge
from the Publications Distribution Unit of the Bank in Washington or from the
European Office of the Bank, 66, avenue d'lena, 75116 Paris, France.
Miyohei Shinohara and Toru Yanagihara are chairman and economist
respectively at the Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo; Kwang Suk Kim is
professor of economics at Kyung Hee University in Seoul and Ramgopal
Agarwala is senior econonmist in the Country Policy Department of the World
Bank.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Shinohara, Miyohei, 1919-
Japanese and Korean experiences in managing develop-
ment.
(World Bank staff working papers ; no. 574. Manage-
ment and development subseries ; no. 1)
Contents: Japan's experience in managing development /
prepared by Miyohei Shinohara and Toru Yanagihara --
Korea's experience in managing development through
planning, policymaking, and budgeting / prepared by
Kwang Suk Kim.
1. Industry and state--Japan. 2. Industry and state--
Korea (South) 3. Japan--Commercial policy. 4. Korea
(South)--Commercial policy. 5. Japan--Economic policy--
1945- . 6. Korea (South)--Economic policy.
7. Industrial management--Japan. 8. Industrial manage-
ment--Korea (South) I. Kim, Kwang Suk. II. Agarwala,
Ramgopal. III. Title. IV. Series: World Bank staff
working papers ; no. 574. V. Series: World Bank staff
working papers. Management and development subseries
no. 1.
HD3616.J33S53 1983 338.9519'5 83-14550
ISBN 0-8213-0233-7
Foreword
This study is one in a series of World Bank Staff Working
Papers devoted to issues of development management. Prepared as
background papers for the World Development Report 1983, they
provide an in-depth treatment of the subjects dealt with in Part
II of the Report. The thirteen papers cover topics ranging from
comprehensive surveys of management issues in different types of
public sector institutions (for example, state-owned enterprises,
the public service, and local government agencies) to broad
overviews of such subjects as planning, management training,
technical assistance, corruption, and decentralization.
The central concern underlying these papers is the search
for greater efficiency in setting and pursuing development
goals. The papers focus on the role of the state in this process,
stress the importance of appropriate incentives, and assess the
effectiveness of alternative institutional arrangements. They
offer no general prescriptions, as the developing countries are
too diverse--politically, culturally, and in economic resources--
to allow the definition of a single strategy.
The papers draw extensively on the experiences of the
World Bank and other international agencies. They were reviewed
by a wide range of readership from developing and developed
countries inside and outside the Bank. They were edited by
Victoria Macintyre. Rhoda Blade-Charest, Banjonglak Duangrat,
Jaunianne Fawkes, and Carlina Jones prepared the manuscripts for
publication.
I hope that these studies will be useful to practitioners
and academicians of development management around the world.
Pierre Landell-Mills
Staff Director
World Development Report 1983
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Preface
Japan and Korea have entered into the folklore of "economic miracles"
as a result of the remarkable economic rrowth they have both achieved in
recent years. Their approach to economic management is thus of interest not
only to the developing, but also to the developed countries. The two papers
presented here by eminent scholars from Korea and Japan and their analysis
discloses the special style of economic management practiced in their
respective countries. Looking at these studies side by side, some interesting
similarities, as well as differences, emerge in the approaches of the two
countries.
A strong partnership between government and the private sector is
perhaps the most striking similarity between the systems of management in
Korea and Japan. The national interest was pursued in each case through
cooperation between businessmen and bureaucrats, with the government providing
leadership and guidance.
Both countries adopted an export-oriented development strategy.
Import substitution was an intermediate step, but the overall goal was to be
able to compete at the international level and to promote exports. Since both
countries lack natural resources, they emphasized industrialization as the key
to rapid growth, but not at the expense of agriculture. Their industrial
policies were concerned primarily with dynamic efficiency, and the two
governments took the initiative in identifying promising sectors.
Despite government activism, prices did not become highly distorted
(with the exception of agriculture), as they have in many developing
countries. Instead, export orientation fostered respect for international
market forces; and when policy mistakes were identified, the pragmatism and
- vii -
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flexibility orevalent in both systems served by and larzc to ^..4it
adjustments in their policies and programs.
In addition, both countries put considerable emphasis on education
and the development of skills, and thus facilitated the rapid transmission of
technology. Moreover, this became a mechanism for achieving social mobility
and improving equity. Another common element was the great interest both
countries showed in collecting and publishing economic data.
Although both Korea and Japan emphasized the partnership approach,
government became a more senior partner in Korea, where the apparatus of
planning and policymaking was more centralized and streamlined. Greater
government activism in Korea was probably an outcome of the near desperate
economic conditions of the early 1960s. By the mid-1970s, however, government
intervention was seen by many in Korea to be excessive and the government
began to turn to the market and the private sector for help. In Japan, by
contrast, planning and policymaking processes were more diffuse, and less
emphasis was placed on well-articulated models, intersectoral consistency, or
even interministerial coordination. Thus, in Korea an elaborate central
authority became responsible for decisionmaking, whereas in Japan consensus-
making took place more from the bottom up. Nonetheless, Japan's cultural
traditions generated a social cohesiveness that enabled it to formulate
coherent policies.
In addition, although both countries followed an outward-oriented
strategy, Korea relied much more on foreign trade. Korea's exports as a ratio
of GNP have been 40 percent or higher since the early 1970s, whereas in Japan
this ratio has been about 10 percent during the last three decades.
Although the experience of these two countries in general confirms
that prices, markets, and outward orientation can play a significant part in
- ix -
economic development, their styles of economic management do not fall neatly
into the conventitonal pigeonholes inL economics. T1he debate on the role of the
state, for example, did not center on ideological questions of state as
against private sector control. Both sectors were combined in a distinctly
indigenous fashion. Although the public sector was large, and government was
to some extent dirigiste, the forces of competition operated to streamline
operations in the public sector. Moreover, dirigism did not automatically
mean "distortionism" in market signals. Similarly, the trade policies adopted
by the two countries cannot be characterized as free trade. Export promotion
and import protection were both emphasized, although protection was selective
and the goal of import protection was to consolidate a base for exporting as
well as to meet domestic demand. Similarly, with regard to competition, both
Japan and Korea allowed competition to become fierce in certain areas, but in
other cases argued that government-induced mergers would be in the interest of
the companies as well as the country. Thus, although both Korea and Japan
followed the basic principles of orthodox economic management, they shifted
direction enough to develop distinctive homegrown styles of management.
No definitive conclusions emerge from the papers on the question of
transferability of the Japanese and the Korean techniques of economic
management to other countries. Nonetheless, some important inferences can be
drawn from the experiences of Japan and Korea regarding the power of prices
and role of competition, both internal and external. They underline the key
role of pragmatism and flexibility in economic management and also offer new
insights into the role of government in managing development.
Ramgopal Agarwala

Japan's Experience in Managing Development
Miyohei Shinohara
Toru Yanagihara
Abstract
This paper tries to assess the place and role of macroeconomic
planning and industrial policy in postwar Japan. The Japanese economy
sustained a high rate of economic growth (averaging around 10 percent) in the
postwar period before it was halved in the wake of the first oil shock. The
postwar high growth period saw a simultaneous achievement of growth, stability
and equity. The process of economic development was characterized by an
upgrading of industrial structure which, in the postwar Japanese context, was
identified with the promotion of heavy and chemical industries. Industrial
development was the driving force of the sustained economic growth.
Industrial programs, therefore, served as the main feature of macroeconomic
plans.
The approach to and system for the management of development in
postwar Japan is not a rigidly structured one. The most important function of
planning and programming consists in concensus formation in the preparation
and drafting stages. Collection of information and exchange of views and
opinions is much facilitated by means of formal and informal contacts
government officials maintain with other ministries and with private
business. Deliberative councils provide a forum where the government's
position is authorized and an atmosphere of concensus is created among parties
concerned. Government's views are often presented as visions--flexible and
adaptable ways of expressing broad common understandings about the present
situations and future prospects.
Industrial development was guided by visions for the industrial
structure and for individual industries. Emphasis was placed on long-term
requirements for development and on the protection and promotion of infant
industries in heavy and chemical industries. The infant industry policy in
postwar Japan was successful in a wide range of industries, and liberalization
of trade and investment proceeded as industries acquired international
competitiveness. The underlying conditions for this success are sought both
in the technical and managerial capabilities of private enterprises and in the
manner in which industrial policies are formulated and implemented. Some
remarks on the historical and sociocultural background are made with a view to
evaluating the transferability of the Japanese experience.
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I. Introduction
1. Japan, like the Republic of Korea, experienced a "success story"
after World War II. In Japan's case, however, the extent to which the
government contributed to industrial growth has become a point of considerable
controversy. Some economists go so far as to claim that growth was achieved
in spite of government intervention, but this is an extreme view. Closer to
the truth is the notion that Japan's postwar economy advanced because of the
interaction between government and private business.
2. In postwar Japan, macroplans and sectoral programs became
institutionalized and thus served as the basis for charting the course of the
economy and identifying policy needs. Japan's foremost concern, according to
the national consensus throughout the 1950s and 1960s, was that it should
catch up with the advanced countries. That goal prompted the upgrading of the
industrial structure and the main thrust of the macroeconomic plans evolved
from the development schemes of the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), whose policy of promoting infant industry was an essential
element of Japan's success in rapid industrialization.
3. In the early stages of Japan's development, serious differences of
opinion had emerged over which industries should be promoted--heavy and
chemical industries which appeared to promise high growth prospects or light
industries in which Japan possessed a clear competitive edge. MITI's
long-term vision of industrial structure was instrumental in breaking up the
stalemate over this issue and in providing positive encouragement to private
enterprises. Thus, the visible hand and, what is probably more important, the
spirit of MITI helped to set in motion and accelerate the chain reaction of
explosive industrial development in Japan after World War II. The management
6-
of uevelopment in this context rannot he understood w.yi-th,out s^am 4 ^f the
basic economic (and possibly sociocultural) conditions under which government
policies were formulated, the goals toward which they were directed, and the
way in which development plans were formulated and implemented during that
period. The following discussion of Japan's experience is based on these
considerations.
II. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
4. The situation in postwar Japan can be summed up in a few words at the
outset: Japan's system of planning, programming, and budgeting was not a
highly structured one. On the whole, the administration made little formal
effort to coordinate long-term planning and annual budgeting. Although in
many cases both planning and budgeting were influenced by the basic policy
stance of political leaders, planning was treated somewhat loosely.
Macroplans and sector programs were not always fully coordinated either, and
inconsistencies between macrovariables and sectoral targets were sometimes
found. Medium- and long-term sector programs were used to prepare relevant
sections of macroplans, and ministries concerned tried to make the most of
them as an effective means of securing funding on a continuous basis.
5. Macroeconomic plans, in this system, merely presented a vision of
development over the medium term and a list of broad policy objectives for key
macrovariables (growth rate, inflation, balance of payments) as well as
industrial composition. Nonetheless, they helped to set the tone of national
priorities, which were often summarized in catch phrases like "economic self-
support," "doubling of the national income," or "rectifying imbalances." How
- 7 -
the system functioned can best be illustrated by first briefly reviewing the
various macroecoromic plaans for'alatedA in the -ostrar period.
Macroeconomic Plans in Postwar Japan
6. The course of Japan's economic development at different stages and in
changing conditions after World War II is reflected in the plans listed in
Table 1. The first official macroplan, the Five-Year Plan for Economic Self-
support drawn up in 1955, was geared to an economy that had already undergone
postwar reconstruction. As well, the first round of rationalization programs
had been instituted in key industries such as iron and steel, electric power,
shipping, coal mining, and fertilizer; and the prewar peak levels of key
macroeconomic and industrial production indicators had been reached. Thus the
nation was ready to consider a new economic goal.
7. The most urgent need at that time was to address certain external and
internal imbalances in the economy. Although Japan's balance of payments
situation had greatly improved during the first half of the 1950s because of
special procurement orders arising from the Korean War, these procurements
were soon to be phased out. Alarm over this balance of payments position
fueled the desire to achieve "self-support" through import substitution and
export expansion. At the same time, Japan faced a serious internal problem:
it had a large pool of unemployed and underemployed. The way to restore
balance in these areas, it was argued, was to upgrade Japan's industrial
structure. This effort was seen as the key to economic growth, and it became
the basic element of all macroplans over the ensuing period of high growth,
which lasted to the end of the 1960s. It is no wonder, then, that industrial
programs and policies occupied a central position in Japan's economic affairs.
8. The emphasis on upgrading the industrial structure, which initially
meant promotion of heavy and chemical industries, led to the next major
-8-
nplans: the Ne_w L -^=r _c r_-, I P _. o 5v- 2 a2u- Lhe Doubling National
Income Plan of 1960-70. In this period more attention was paid to machinery
industries because of their growth potential and high labor intensity, and
subsequently to the newly established petrochemical and electronics
industries.
9. The Doubling National Income Plan is of particular interest because
it brought about a great change in the mood of the nation. The sustained
growth and rapid advances in industrialization after reconstruction infused
the plan with optimism toward Japan's economic prospects--Japan was thought to
be entering a new stage of development that would be characterized by
widespread technical progress. The overall goal was to maintain growth
potential and eliminate the constraints on growth. The main policy objectives
were to provide social overhead capital for the long range, to guide the
upgrading of the industrial structure, to develop manpower and promote science
and technology, and to rectify the imbalances in the economy.
10. The plan was a manifestation of the growth-oriented economic policy
promoted by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, who had earlier been an official in
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and thus knew how to persuade the MOF to accept
his philosophy of "positive finance." Ikeda pushed for and won large
increases in public budgeting in fiscal 1961 and 1962. He also encouraged the
Bank of Japan to install a low rate of interest. This policy had a tremendous
impact: it created an atmosphere of future-orientedness, dispelled pessimism,
and fostered a strong belief in the growth potential of the Japanese economy.
11. The mood of the nation changed again, however, during the preparation
in 1965 of the Medium-term Economic Plan, which aimed at "rectifying the
imbalances" caused by high and continued growth. Emphasis was therefore
placed on modernizing low-productivity sectors such as small-scale industries
and agriculture, and on improving the standard of living and social welfare.
This new emphasis was carried over to the subsequent Economic arid Oocial
(Development) plans, in which the industrial programs focused on
internationalization as a result of the liberalization of trade and foreign
investment in 1960s. The general goal of later plans, which was to improve
economic efficiency, still included the upgrading of the industrial structure,
except that knowledge-intensive activities now received increasing attention.
Growth Target and Actual Performance
12. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the target growth rate was set at a
level below the performance prior to the plan period, and it was exceeded by
the actual performance during the plan period (Table 1). Note, too, that
every plan was replaced by a new one before it was completed. This trend was
all to the good insofar as the goal of the plan was to achieve maximum
growth. In each case the higher actual growth rate was related to the higher-
than-expected growth in private investment, which was not pressed by the
government to stick to the plan target.
13. This overachievement of plan targets appears to be related to several
factors. One is that during these years the growth potential of Japan's
economy was constanly underestimated since no one perceived the self-
reinforcing nature of Japan's economic growth, which was moving in cycles of
capacity growth and demand expansion. Instead, the high growth rates achieved
were regarded as temporary or exceptional occurrences. In addition, it was
widely believed that once the prewar peak level was attained, the economy
would more or less follow the prewar trend of growth; thus the first two plans
were criticized as being too optimistic. Attitudes changed, however, when the
economy continued to thrive as a result of the strong performance of exports
and the sharp rise in private fixed investment. During this time, MITI's
- 10 -
Table 1 Selected Features of Economic Plans in Postwar Japan
\ Name of plan Five-year Plan Doubling
for Economic New Long-range National Medium-term
Self-support Economic Plan Income Plan Economic Plan
Date published December, 1955 December, 1957 December, 1960 January, 1965
Cabinet at the Hatoyama Kishi Ikeda Sato
time of plan
approval
Plan period 1956-60 1958-62 1961-70 1964-68
(Fiscal years)
Performance P.1952-55: F.1953-57: F.1956-60: F.1960-64:
prior to 8.6% 7.3% 9.1% 11.3%
the plan
Economic
growth Projection F.1956-60: F.1958-62: F.1961-70: F.1964-68:
rate in the plan 5.0% 6.5% 7.8% 8.1%
Actual F.1956-60: F.1958-62: F.1961-70: F.1964-68:
performance 8.7% 9.9% 10.7% 10.6%
plan period
Method of projection Colm method Desirable balance Growth rate Econometric
(Labor x pro- chosen from 3 cases previously model
ductivity) with different decided
growth rates
Plan objectives Self-support To maximize growth; To maximize growth; To rectify
of the improve national improve national imbalances
economy; living; full living; full
full employment employment employment
Major policy To modernize To improve To improve To modernize low
objectives production faci- infrastructure social overhead productivity
lities; promote heavy industrial- capital; improve sectors; make
international ization; promote industrial efficient use
trade; reduce exports; encourage structure; rectify of labor force;
dependence on savings the dual structure improve quality
imports; encour- of the economy and of national
age savings improve social living
stability
Source: Planning Bureau of Japan, Economic Planning Agency.
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Economic and New Economic Basic Economic Plan New Economic
Social and Social Economic and for the Second and social
Development plan Development Plan Social Plan Half of the 1970s Seven-year plan
March, 1967 April, 1970 February, 1973 May, 1976 August, 1979
Sato Sato Tanaka Miki Ohira
1967-71 1970-75 1973-77 1976-80 1979-85
F.1962-66: F.1965-69: F.1968-72: F.1971-75: F.1974-78:
10.0% 12.7% 10.4Z 5.1% 4.0%
F.1967-71: F.1970-75: F.1973-77: F.1976-80: F.1979-85
8.2% 10.6% 9.4% a little more 5.7%
than 6%
F.1967-71: F.1970-75: F.1973-77: F.1976-78: --
10.9% 5.9% 4.2% 5.7%
Econometric Econometric Econometric Econometric Econometric
model model model model model
To attain To construct To promote To realize a To shift to a
balanced an admirable national richer national stable growth
and steady society through welfare, life and stable path; enrich
economic balanced econ- international development of quality of
development omic growth cooperation the country's national life;
economy contribute to
the development
of the inter-
national econ-
omic community
To stabilize To improve econ- To create a To stabilize prices To attain full
prices; improve omic efficiency comfortable; and secure full employment and
economic from an inter- environment; employment; stabil- stabilization of
efficiency; national view- secure a stable ized life and prices; stabilize
promote social point; stabilize and comfortable create favorable and enrich national
development prices; promote life; stabilize living environment; life; cooperate
social develop- prices; promote cooperate with and in and contribute
ment; maintain international contribute to the to the development
adequate economic cooperation development of the of the world econ-
growth and culti- world economy; omy and society;
vate development secure economic ensure economic
foundations security and foster security and
grounds for long- foster the found-
term development ations of further
development;
reconstruct public
finance and new
monetary responses
- 12 -
i. dustrial rationlaizarion and modernization programs were instrumental in
guiding Japan's private enterprises in capacity expansion and technological
innovation.
14. A second factor that affected plan targets was the inconsistency in
the Doubling National Income Plan between macroeonomic projections for demand
and sectoral projections for production, particularly in industry. Private
enterprises conceivably took the latter as guidelines. In any case, targets
for heavy and chemical industries were set much higher than they would have
been if they had been based on final demand components and the input-output
matrix. Those industries were energetically promoted by MITI and production
projections were based on MITI's vision of industrial development.
Furthermore, private enterprises took these projections as minimum targets, so
the keen competition for an expanding market share resulted in a much higher
capacity for production than projected by MITI.
15. Another reason for the discrepancy between planned and realized
growth rates may be that the MOF intentionally underestimated the growth
rate. Since its fiscal programs were based on target growth rates, actual
growth rates higher than target would bring about "natural increases" in tax
revenues. Thus, the MOF would have more uncommitted resources at its disposal
(see para. 29).
16. Whether any of the preceding factors adversely affected Japan's
economic development is not clear. Admittedly, the unexpected economic growth
spearheaded by large corporations in heavy and chemical industries caused
consumer prices to rise and worsened the balance of payments situation. But
too much attention to balance and consistency in planning might have reduced
the growth potential of the economy.
- 13 -
Macroeconomic Planning
17. The national economic plan in Japanr has two basic components. First,
it contains a list of sectoral programs, which are formulated by the
ministries concerned. Although the goals of those sectoral programs are
supposed to be achieved through the efforts of government, it gives little
attention to coordinating these goals. Second, macroplans present a
projection of macroeconomic variables over the plan period. The economic
figures amount to nothing more than a rough forecast, however, and are not
regarded as targets in any strict sense of the word.
18. Macroplans in Japan are, in effect, loosely constructed guidelines
that lack the means of implementation. Ministries and agencies do not regard
plan targets as binding, partly because econo,nic developments in the past
diverged from the projected course; thus, adherence to the original target
came to be considered useless, or even harmful. In addition, since budgetary
appropriation and fiscal investments and loan plans are processed annually,
the MOF tries to avoid long-range commitments. Consequently, macroeconomic
planning in postwar Japan merely "indicated" quantitative targets for private
sector performance as well as the general direction of economic development
and the role of individual sectors in development. Plan preparation provided
a forum in which future policy needs could be identified and examined from
several standpoints, and it enabled private enterprises to see their problems
in a broad perspective.
19. At the beginning of the 1960s, however, the Doubling National Income
Plan had specified a larger role for long-term macroeconomic planning in the
market economy. This plan, at least, was to be an operational program for the
public sector, while merely providing assent to private sector activities
(although it contemplated guiding private activities through policy
- 14 -
measures). In oruer to provide effectivp uidellines for ec.no-'.4 -- s'-ent
the plan called for the coordination of long-term sectoral programs; also,
short-term economic policies were to be in line with the long-term goals,
although flexibility was considered an important ingredient in short-term
policy. This document represented the first formal recognition of the need
for coordination between the macroplan and sectoral programs and between long-
term plan and short-term management. As this discussion has already
indicated, Japan's system of economic management has not followed that
pattern.
20. Since macroplans tend to be a collection of sectoral programs, those
programs have become the means of securing funds for the activities of various
ministries; to the extent that annual budgeting is influenced by the policy
stance reflected in macroplanning, ministries are eager to have their programs
listed in the marcoplan. On the whole, however, annual budgeting has followed
the established pattern and the MOF has maintained strong control over
expenditures.
21. The Administrative Reform Council has repeatedly advocated that the
macroplan, sectoral programs, and annual budget should be coordinated and that
the government should use macroeconomic planning as a means of overall
economic management. It can be argued, however, that such formal consistency
would lead to rigidity in planning, programming, and budgeting, and could
stifle the initiative of people involved in project design at the microlevel.
Economic Agencies
22. Japan's political system in the postwar period is one of
parliamentary democracy, with the National Diet electing the prime minister.
Despite the constitutional supremacy of its power, the actual function of the
Diet rarely goes beyond the formality of deliberating and authorizing
- 15 -
legislations prepared and proposed by the Cabinet. The genuine process of
deliberation takes place tn the -reparation and drafting of legislation, with
sponsoring ministries taking initiatives and making consultations with other
ministries, the ruling party, and interest groups. In this way bureaucrats in
the executive branch exert substantial influence and effective control over
the policymaking process. Ministries and agencies involved in overall
economic management are the Economic Planning Agency (EPA), in charge of
macroeconomic planning; the Ministry of Finance (MOF), responsible for
budgeting; and the Ministry of International Trade arnd Industry (MITI),
dealing with external transactions and industrial programming.
23. Economic Planning Agency (EPA). The main function of the EPA is to
analyze domestic and international economic situations and to coordinate
Japan's overall economic policies. It is responsible for the preparation of
long-term plans and annual economic projections. Unlike the other ministries,
the EPA is not associated with any particular interest groups and does not
engage in routinized policymaking. In addition, it has no means of
implementation under its control and its influence is exerted only through its
function as a coordinator of economic policies. Some of EPA's key posts have
been held by transferees from other ministries, notably MITI and MOF.
24. EPA's contribution to management lies in its long-range and
comprehensive approach to economic issues through systematic investigation and
analysis. Its long-range perspective contrasts with MOF's emphasis on short-
term macroeconomic management, and its broad range of interests with MITI's
special interest in industrial development. EPA tries to identify problems
and tasks of the future. Through its Planning Bureau, it developed a general
framework for macroeconomic planning that evolved into a macroeconometric
model for projection. This model, linked with input-output analysis, was used
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to prepare the Medium-term Economic Plan of the ,id-1960s (see Table ',, which
emphasized, first, achieving consistency between macroeconomic targets and
projections in the industrial sector and, second, understanding the tradeoffs
among macroeconomic variables such as rate of growth, balance of payments, and
rate of inflation. Since then, the econometric model has been a permanent
feature of macroplanning in Japan.
25. In the mid-1960s EPA assumed responsibility for price policy,
consumer affairs, and the standard of living--areas that had not been properly
covered by other ministries and agencies--and it helped to establish the
Economic Welfare Bureau. Because of the general enthusiasm for "rectifying
imbalances" and realizing the ideals of the welfare state, the EPA was able to
strengthen its position by representing the interests of consumers and
promoting national well-being. Toward the late 1960s, however, the EPA found
itself ineffectual in the face of new macroeconomic developments (consumer
prices had risen to around 6 percent per annum and the trade surplus had
become a standard phenomenon). Although an upward revaluation of the yen
seemed necessary at the time to attain internal and external balances,
revaluation was a political taboo and the EPA was not able to reflect its
rational macroeconomic viewpoint in government policies.
26. Ministry of Finance (MOF). The primary function of the MOF is to
prepare the annual budget. Traditionally, the MOF has had almost sole power
over the size and allocation of the budget, but since the mid-1960s that power
has been somewhat eroded by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. MOF
officials are strongly committed to protecting fiscal discipline and do not
like to have their prerogatives challenged. Their activities have been guided
by the principle of the balanced budget, which was established through the Law
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on Public Finance (1947) prohibiting the issuance of long-term government
bonds to cover zeneral account deficits.
27. The principle of the balanced budget was upheld by the MOF as a means
of maintaining fiscal neutrality against political pressures, and it was not
modified until 1965 when strong countercyclical fiscal stimulation was
needed. As a result, public expenditure moved largely procyclically with
nominal GNP up to 1965, except for the period 1954-56, and the early 1960s.
In the first case, a constant "one trillion yen budget" was maintained to
control inflation and the balance of payments deficit (conservative fiscal
management over this period was guided by Finance Minister Hisato Ichimade).
Meanwhile, in the early 1960s when Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda promoted the
Doubling National Income Plan, fiscal policy underwent a clear shift toward
activism, and demand management became geared to the realization of the growth
potential.
28. When the balanced budget principle was abandoned in 1965, the MOF
became alarmed; at the same time, the medium-term programs pushed through by
various ministries heightened concern about the rigid approach to public
expenditures. With a pessimistic view of the economy's prospects for growth,
the MOF campaigned for budget cutbacks. Resumed high rates of growth during
the second half of the 1960s generated large increases in tax revenue,
however, and alleviated the fear of a crisis in public finance.
29. Budgeting in Japan can be divided into two basic activities:
determining the size of the total expenditure, and allocating these funds
among ministries and major items. The overall budget level is determined by
projections of the economic situation and tax revenue for the next fiscal
year. The annual macroeconomic projection is prepared by the EPA.
(Typically, EPA presents a compromise view between the bullish MITI and
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underestimate growth rates intentionally in order to control demand from the
ministries. Throughout the postwar era, the MOF has also been careful not to
give the appearance of promoting a stimulative fiscal policy and has made sure
that annual growth rates in the general account budget were kept below
estimated GNP growth rates.
30. Although the MOF has certainly been under the influence of a
conservative doctrine of fiscal management, basically it has not been opposed
to growth. On the contrary, it was instrumental in providing the stimulus to
savings and investment in general. At the same time, MOF's conservative
fiscal management proved to be sound demand management under persistently
strong private demand. On several occasions the "positive financing" promoted
by a strong political leadership tended to overheat economic activities and
thus necessitated a policy of drastic stabilization (for example, in 1957
under ishibashi, in 1961 under Ikeda, and in 1972-73 under Tanaka). These
experiences suggest that the cautious stance of demand management adopted by
the MOF helped to sustain economic growth after 1955.
31. The MOF has tried to keep the government small in terms of the ratio
of public expenditure and tax revenue to GNP. It reduced the tax on income
several times to prevent the tax ratio from rising under high growth of
nominal GNP and progressive taxation. Because of these income tax reductions,
private savings have increased and have been channeled to finance rapidly
growing private investments. One particularly notable feature of
macroeconomic policy in Japan over the period of high growth was its pursuit
of a low interest rate. The consensus was that international competitiveness
in the large manufacturing industries had to be strengthened, and that the low
interest rate would help to reduce financial cost and stimulate investment.
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In addition, the share of investment in public expenditure has been very high
in postwar Japan ever since the proviLsi'Eon Of soc'ial over,ead cap4 tal was
recognized as a precondition of sustained economic growth. The Fiscal
Investment and Loan Plan (FILP), for example, was an effective scheme to
channel public funds into public and private investment.
32. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). All matters
concerning industry and commerce are under the jurisdiction of MITI, which is
strongly committed to fostering Japan's industries and has been active in
identifying problem areas and formulating policies to cope with them.
Traditionally, MITI's stance on industrial development has approached
nationalistic zeal. The sections of MITI concerned with the subdivisions of
industry have always consulted closely with the management and technical staff
of private enterprises and with the representatives of trade associations on
the current performance and future prospects of industries. The careful
attention MITI has given to business affairs is often compared to the
attention a mother gives a student preparing for an entrance examination:
that is to say, MITI went to great lengths to help Japan's industries enter
into international competition.
33. Since the primary goal of postwar economic development was to catch
up with advanced countries, MITI's main function was to draw up strategies for
the most rapid and efficient attainment of that national goal. MITI was
highly pessimistic about the preparedness of Japanese industries, however; it
was particularly concerned about the excessive competition, within Japan,
among small enterprises. MITI believed that defects in Japanese industries
could be corrected by focusing on industry-specific targets. Unlike the
macroeconomic plans prepared by EPA, MITI's industrial programs have been
based on a detailed analysis of the technical and financial situation of
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identify both the responses required by private concerns as well as supportive
policy measures.
34. MITI also believed that Japan's industries would not be able to
compete internationally unless they realized technical and financial economies
of scale. One important element in MITI's postwar industrial policy was its
emphasis on industrial reorganization. In particular, it encouraged mergers;
and it coordinated investment behavior and specialization through formal
(legislative) and informal (administrative) measures. MITI's industrial
policy thus ran counter to the orthodox Western approach to development, which
favored a market mechanism and free competition. That essentially "static"
approach, it was argued, fails to take into account the possibility that
industries can change dynamically in comparative advantage or disadvantage
over a period of ten or twenty years. Such an approach seemed inappropriate
in formulating a policy for industrial development in Japan. Instead, MITI
favored a new concept of income elasticity for the demand side and comparative
technical progress for the supply side as a basis for development policy.
35. Understandably, then, MITI's policy concentrated on upgrading the
industrial structure. According to the Research Committee on Industrial
Policy formed within MITI to clarify this concept, it meant, first, increasing
the share of the industrial or manufacturing sector in the national economy as
well as expanding heavy and chemical industries within the manufacturing
sector. Second, it meant improving the technology and equipment in individual
industries. The upgrading of the industrial structure was therefore seen as a
means of increasing capital intensity and labor productivity in the entire
economy. In other words, MITI presented this policy as comprehensive and
dynamic vision of economic development.
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Role of Consensus Formation in Planning
36. Another distinctive feature of japanis system of planning is the
"consensusmaking" that takes place at various levels; that is, macroplanning
involves consultation among government ministries and between the government
and the private sector. This means that many individuals having diverse
interests and opinions are directly involved in the planning process.
Although a consensus may often be reached by way of ambiguous and noncommittal
expressions, the interaction among the parties concerned helps to delineate
the macroeconomic challenges the nation is facing and places industry-specific
issues within a macroeconomic perspective. As noted earlier, macroeconomic
planning in Japan does not proceed through the formal coordination of
competing or conflicting demands for resources. The allocation of funds is
part of the annual budgeting activities.
37. At one level of planning, consensus is the result of deliberation in
economic councils formed for this purpose. They provide a forum in which
private interest groups and scholars can present their views on the basic
goals of economic management. The agenda for council meetings are prepared by
the secretariat, which is staffed by EPA officials, and EPA views set the
basic tone of the consensus to be "authorized" at the council. Inter-
ministerial coordination takes place when ministries add their revisions to
the draft plan prepared by EPA. This process requires rewriting sections of
the plan through consultations between EPA and ministries concerned. Ministry
officials are assigned to the appropriate sections of EPA to serve as a medium
in coordinating each ministry's interests with EPA's overall perspective.
38. Japan's method of reaching consensus has both its advantages and
disadvantages. One one hand, widespread participation in the dialogue helps
to strengthen the public's sense of involvement in national goal setting and
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facilitates the acceptance or the consensui. The Minri tri-S' direct
involvement in plan revision has a similar effect. During Lhe period of high
growth, for example, interministerial conflicts were neither frequent nor
serious because ministries had a common goal, which was to modernize the
entire economy. On the other hand, this approach to planning leads to
procrastination in decisionmaking on major economic issues, since drastic
reforms are apt to be put off unless overwhelming external pressures are
present. The reluctance to revaluate the yen upward in the late 1960s is a
case in point. Another disadvantage of the system is that the consensus tends
to yield to vested interests, as it did in the question of maintaining a price
support for rice as a means of subsidizing farm households.
39. A large number of deliberative councils are active in the
decisionmaking process in Japan. These groups are said to be independent
organs responsible for setting priorities and guidelines for policy
formulation. In reality, however, council members merely comment on drafts of
guidelines prepared by bureaucrats; serious discussion among themselves rarely
takes place. As a result, many council meetings are occasions for authorizing
a bureau's or section's policy decision made in advance through informal
bilateral consultations between the bureaucrats and private parties
involved. Now and then, academics and other neutral members may make
important contributions in setting the basic tone of a council's proposal or
in providing a theoretical basis to the government's position. On the whole,
however, the main purpose of these deliberative councils is to create an
atmosphere of consensus around the government's views, which are often
presented as "visions." Visions thus authorized serve as a guiding principle
in the formulation of economic policy and also serve as a frame of reference
in consultations between government and the private sector.
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40. Visions may pertain to any level of the economy--macroeconomic
sectoral, or industrial. All visions have certain elements In common. They
tend, for example, to point out the defects and problems in current domestic
situations and to compare these situations with those in advanced Western
countries. Visions may also identify recently emerging trends that have
enabled policymakers to judge what could be done as well as what should be
done to improve the economy. Visions seemed to have considerable impact on
the upgrading of the industrial structure during the postwar period as they
provided an effective framework for policy formulation.
41. The Japanese style of decisionmaking may be characterized as a
"bottom-up" approach in the sense that initiatives for and inputs to
policymaking come from the bottom level of bureaucracy; that is, proposals are
formulated by section staff members and then are thoroughly discussed, first
within the section and subsequently at higher levels. Policy coordination
within and between ministries is carried out formally and informally at
various levels. One clear merit of the bottom-up approach is that basic
policy details are compiled by those government officials who have access to
the required information through their daily contact with various
industries. One possible disadvantage of this approach is that narrow
interests may come to be emphasized in policymaking. That problem seems to
have been largely avoided in Japan because of its effective system of
examining and evaluating initial proposals at both higher and lower levels of
government, and because of its practice of training government officials to be
generalists by assigning them to diverse fields and functions within
ministries every two to three years. At least the problem has not been
prevalent within individual ministries. Interministerial policy coordination,
by contrast, has never been as effective, and rivalry and sectionalism have
- 24 -
been regular features OL Japan's bureaucracy. in Lne anseiLct oL: -ton-down"
leadership, mechanistic criteria have been applied to budget allocation in
line with the practice of incrementalism.
42. The provision of social overhead capital has been one important
result of macroeconomic planning in Japan. After the Doubling National Income
Plan proposed closer coordination between the macroeconomic plan and sector
programs and between long-term planning and annual budgeting, multiyear
programming of infrastructure construction was undertaken to alleviate and
prevent bottlenecks in economic growth. (Much emphasis was placed on the
transportation sector, for example, especially road transportation.) Many
ministries formulated medium- and long-term programs as a means of securing
budget allocation over the long term. However, this new feature in budgeting
was not always effective in safeguarding steady and smooth funding of public
investment programs because these expenditures were subject to annual
fluctuations in short-term fiscal management.
III. Formulation and Implementation of Industrial Policy:
Objectives and Instruments
43. The industrial policy that was designed and implemented by MITI and
that became the backbone of macroeconomic development plans over the 1950s and
1960s went through several changes during this period, in both its objectives
and instruments. Immediately after the war, when most efforts were directed
toward the recovery of industrial production, a priority production scheme was
adopted in which Japan's limited resources were concentrated in the production
of coal and steel. That recovery, which lasted up to 1948, was accompanied by
rampant inflation fueled by public loans and subsidies. Consequently, a
drastic stabilization program was carried out in 1949; and the goal of
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industrial policy became "industrial rationalization" for key industries such
as iron and steel, coal, electric power, shippi.ng, fertilizer, and textilea.
44. During the first half of the 1950s, Japan took several measures to
protect and promote its infant industries. One was legislation for the
protection of industries from foreign competition in the Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law (1949) and the Foreign Capital Law (1950). In
addition, a protective tariff was set up. As for the policy measures that
were to promote infant industry, these included fiscal incentives and
financial support for selected industries as well as public investment in
industry-related infrastructure. Tax exemptions and special depreciation
allowances were granted for the favored industries, and various kinds of tax-
exempt reserves were designated. It is noteworthy that export earnings
enjoyed a tax-exempt status. Financial supports included the provision of
public funds at low interest rates. A large number of public financial
institutions were established during the first half of the 1950s and the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan was organized in its present form in 1953 to
facilitate systematic deployment of governmental investment funds.
45. During the second half of the 1950s industrial policy promoted the
machinery industries as well as new industries such as petrochemicals,
plastics, synthetic fiber, and electronics through fiscal incentives and
financial preferences. Those branches of manufacturing were to become the
cutting edge in upgrading the industrial structure toward heavy and chemical
industries. The support given to selected industries contributed
substantially to the rapid growth of those industries. The provision of
public funds facilitated the financing of new and (ex ante) uncertain projects
by providing a "seal of approval" that encouraged private financial
institutions to follow suit. Tax exemptions reduced the effective tax rate on
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corporate earaings and enabled fledgling firms to retain a higher nercentage
of the profit.
46. One notable feature of industrial policy as it applied to machinery
and electronics was the emphasis it placed on upgrading small- and medium-
scale manufacturers of parts and components. The technical and managerial
improvements in industries of this size achieved under government-sponsored
rationalization and modernization programs led to considerable productivity
increases in the machinery and electronics industries. Since small- and
medium-scale industries exhibited a high capacity to absorb employment, the
distribution of income improved at the same time that the economy was
experiencing rapid growth.
47. Industrial policy during the 1960s, meanwhile, aimed at strengthening
Japan's ability to compete internationally. The key to international
competitiveness was sought in a restructuring of industrial organization.
When the Japanese government committed itself to programs of trade and capital
liberalization, the concern over international competition deepened. MITI's
worries were twofold. First, too many firms of too small a scale were engaged
in excessive competition. Second, MITI was faced with the loss of a
legislative basis for influencing private industries through the control of
foreign trade and direct investment. It therefore advocated new legislation,
the Special Measures Law for the Promotion of Designated Industries (1963),
which was originally named the Law for Strengthening of International
Competitiveness of Designated Industries. In MITI's view, it was essential to
integrate existing production units into larger and more efficient enterprises
and to carry out this reorganization under effective government leadership.
Liberalization raised the specter of foreign dominance and thus cast a shadow
on the postwar industrializaton efforts. In this atmosphere of deepening
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crisis, the implementation of the liberalization programs proceeded gradually
and selectively. Although the above-mentioned new legislation failed to pass
the Diet, MITI continued to pursue industrial reorganization vigorously, by
arranging mergers and coordinating investment projects. Lacking legal
authority, MITI relied heavily on an informal means of persuading and guiding
the private sector--that is, through administrative guidance.
48. The promotion of heavy and chemical industries succeeded in
generating high rates of economic growth that were sustained for two
decades. At the same time, a host of environmental problems developed,
particularly in industrial centers and congested cities, and they reached a
peak toward the close of the 1960s. The way to cope with this situation,
according to the vision of industrial policy for the decade of the 1970s, was
to improve the standard of living from a broad perspective. Thus the
guidelines for industrial structure were expanded to include "environmental
effect" and "quality of work" in addition to the "income elasticity" and
"productivity increase" that had been adopted in the preceding decades.
Industrial policy now emphasized the development of knowledge-intensive
industries (conceptualized as research and development), sophisticated
assembly, fashion-oriented industries, and information-related industries.
49. During the early 1970s Japan's industries suffered a series of
shocks, which accelerated the reorientation of its industrial policy. The
rapid appreciation of the yen after the breakup of the regime advocating a
fixed exchange rate accentuated the fact that Japan's labor-intensive
industries were less and less able to compete with the prices of the
industrializing countries in East Asia. In addition, the first international
oil crisis dealt a devastating blow to those branches of the heavy and
chemical industries that depended on petroleum as a source of energy and
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feedstock. For one thi-ng, the increased price of Detroleimm put user
industries at a cost disadvantage in relation to their competitors, who were
able to turn to alternative sources of energy or feedstock. Second, the oil
crisis ushered in a new era of slow growth, both domestically and
internationally. Japan's rate of growth fell from 10 percent to 5 percent a
year; meanwhile, the producers of industrial intermediate good were
particularly hard hit by an even more drastic reduction in investment
activities.
50. Structural adjustment thus became a serious problem for Japan's
economic managers in the 1970s. They faced the gloomy task of coping with
excess capacities in old (labor-intensive) and new (energy-intensive)
"structurally depressed" industries. For the first time in MITI's postwar
history, most of its assignments were backward-looking in that it had to take
care of the contraction, rather than the expansion, of Japan's industries. In
short order, however, MITI managed to turn necessity into a virtue. It found
a new, forward-looking challenge in technological development. Unlike the
previous decades, when the essential ingredient of technological progresss had
been the import of technology from advanced countries, now was the time to
emphasize indigenous research and development, which were directed toward
pollution control, energy saving and diversification, and labor saving, mainly
through electronic automation. MITI began exploring technological frontiers
with the same vigor that it had shown earlier in the search for ways to catch
up with advanced countries.
51. Significant as it was, technological development did not solve all
the adjustment problems of the 1970s, many of which--in both the old and new
structurally depressed industries--had to be tackled in a backward-looking
manner by orderly contraction of production capacity. Also, some lines of
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business had to be diversified and some locations shifted through direct
foreign investment. In many cases, even downright scrapping of the existing
facilities and a reduction in the workforce were necessary. Nonetheless, with
its forward-looking vision of industrial development well established, MITI
managed to abide by the principle of positive adjustment and free trade
throughout the difficult times of adjustment after the oil crisis.
Effect of MITI's Industrial Policy
52. The effectiveness of MITI's industrial policy cannot be adequately
evaluated without considering its purpose and the manner i n which it was
formulated and implemented. The goal of MITI's postwar industrial policy, as
pointed out earlier, was to upgrade Japan's industrial structure through
compositional changes in the manufacturing sector and through the
restructuring of industrial organization within each industry. The first step
it took in this direction was to protect Japan from foreign competition and to
promote incentives for priority industries. These measures offered support
and guarantees to private investors.
53. Since investment decisions are made on the assumption that certain
supply-side and demand-side conditions will prevail over a period of ten to
fifteen years, private firms face the risk of uncertain future developments in
financial, labor, and product markets. Market prices, no doubt important and
effective signals in adjusting demand and supply in the short run, play a more
limited role in investment decisions on the technique and scale of production
as well as the choice of product. MITI's protective and promotional policy
measures served to reduce those risks on the supply side, while macroeconomic
plans and industrial programs did so on the demand side. Moreover, the
incentive measures affected the cost-benefit calculations of investment
projects directly by increasing net cash flow (tax exemptions and accelerated
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depreciation allowaLaces) adu by reducing the discount rate (inw rct
financing).
54. This last point has great bearing on the choice of industry and
technology in strengthening the economy. As stated earlier, MITI's two
criteria for dynamic industries were high income elasticity and high rate of
technical progress. To promote investment in dynamic industries and
technologies, MITI found it helpful to modify relative factor prices so that
they would reflect factor endowments in some future period.
55. Furthermore, MITI had to deal with the question of appropriate scale
in the choice of technology. The market cannot sustain perfect (atomistic)
competition in the presence of scale economies. If resources are to be
efficiently allocated under the condition of decreasing long-run average cost,
production units have to be large enough to enjoy economies of scale. This
consideration and the excessive competition among smaller than optimal scale
producers in the free market prompted MITI to intervene in the decisions of
private investors. It tried to realize scale economies, as pointed out
earlier, by introducing controls on technology imports, by coordinating joint
or staggered investment plans through administrative guidance, and by
arranging mergers--measures that were not entirely successful. In addition,
MITI had to recommend production cuts or depression cartels to deal with the
excess supply arising from the fierce competition among producers.
56. MITI's protection and promotion of priority industries were, however,
partly responsible for this competition, since private enterprises (which were
strongly motivated to invest and innovate because of the rapid growth already
achieved) took macroeconomic plans and industrial programs as minimum targets
in their investment plans. In some cases, MITI's guideline of basing
production quota or capacity expansion quota on existing levels of capacity
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induced companies to invest in new equipment while keeping old equipment. In
insuring against cutthroat competition. the production cuts and depression
cartels administered by MITI to maintain market order must also have
contributed to more aggressive investment behavior.
MITI's Policy for Infant Industries
57. The first point to note is that in postwar Japan infant industry
protection across the board was a rule rather than an exception, even though
it seemed to run counter to the doctrine of free trade. This phenomenon was a
product of Japan's bottom-up approach to policy formulation. That is, under
Japan's system, each section in MITI is responsible for designing policy
measures for the industry under its charge. Thus, nurturing measures were
applied to almost all the industries under MITI's jurisdiction, albeit with
differing scope and intensity according to the relative importance attached to
individual industries. There was no overall design specifying the industries
to be nurtured, except that in the early 1960s industry performances and the
general principle of shifting industrial structure toward heavy and chemical
industries led to the establishment of theoretical criteria for the choice of
industry (income elasticity and technical progress).
58. Since Japan discouraged the direct involvement of either state
enterprises or foreign companies, how was it possible, then, for it to nurture
infant industries successfully across the board? The answer again lies in the
dynamism and aggressiveness of private enterprises in various industrial
fields, and in the basic purpose of MITI's industrial policy, which was to
provide incentives to private investment. Another important factor was that
Japan had maintained an undervalued exchange rate of 360 yen to the U.S.
dollar. When the rate was initially set, Japan's international balance of
payments position was precarious. Before long, however, potential for excess
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exports develsopDc with the normalization of the -orld economy an.d ti
successful deployment of Japan's increasingly large network of foreign
branches. Also, Japan prudently did not absorb the excess by accumulating
foreign exchange reserves; rather, it absorbed the reserves through continued
domestic expansion. The rapid growth in export thus rebounded, creating a
boom in domestic investment, which in turn created a boom in export by
decreasing unit costs. Thus investment and exports became caught up in a
.virtuous" circle.
59. Both of the preceding factors also account for the second distinctive
features of Japan's infant industry policy in the postwar period--that is, its
somewhat limited duration. Of course, other factors were involved as well.
Many economists would argue that, in fact, MITI stuck to its protectionist
stance too long and thereby unduly delayed liberalization of Japan's
economy. The postponement of liberalization seems justifiable, however, in
view of the c'rc-umstarces. For one thing, it was generally understood that a
protective policy would be necessary to promote industrial maturing and
thereby strengthen Japan's position on the international market. The
promotional measures designed to strengthen the supply side also served to
increase dynamic competition among private enterprises, and thus forestalled
the inefficiency and stagnation that might otherwise have developed under the
protection from international competition.
60. Another, perhaps more important, reason for strengthening Japan's
competitiveness can be found in its great dependence on the import of
essential raw materials and fuels. The ever-present sense of urgency
underlying Japan's emphasis on export promotion is well summarized in the
expression "export or perish.' It was therefore deemed absolutely necessary
to develop the heavy and chemical industries into export industries if the
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economy was to attain sustained growth. Industrial policy, then, not only
offered support for raising the efficiency of Droduction. but it also provided
a general incentive for exportation. Modernization and reorganization of
small-scale industries were particularly important in this connection.
61. The desire to join the ranks of advanced countries and, what is
probably more important, the pressures exerted by Western countries led Japan
to accept the principle of liberalization at the beginning of the 1960s. An
import liberalization program was drawn up for the period 1960-63. In 1963
Japan moved to the Article 11 status in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, and in 1964 it moved to Article 8 status in the International Monetary
Fund. When Japan joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development in 1964, it committed itself to capital liberalization, which it
initiated in 1967.
62. Since MITI, along with its client industries, had been skeptical
about the preparedness of Japanese industries, it tried to postpone decontrol
of imports or foreign investment for what were considered its vulnerable
sectors. Detailed studies of the effects of liberalization were carried out
and timetables for liberalization were prepared for various industries.
Subsequently, programs were formulated to strengthen competitiveness through
investment and innovation. In this way, MITI wisely made the targeted removal
of protection serve as an effective policy instrument to stimulate
improvements in efficiency. The cost of prematurely exposing infant industry
to uncontrolled competition would have had far more serious repercussions than
its postponement of liberalization.
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IV. Concluding Remarks- Lessons from JaDan's Exnprn-^nr
63. The rapid economic growth in postwar Japan was an across-the-board
and cumulative process of industrial development. Industrial policy played a
crucial supportive role in this process by presenting visions and providing
protective and promotional measures to infant industries. Macroeconomic
policies also provided favorable conditions for economic growth by combining
easy money (low interest rate) and tight fiscal (balanced budget) policies.
The Ministry of Finance saw to it that social overhead capital would be
available to meet the needs of industrial development by according priority to
these needs in its annual budget and in the allocation of public funds under
the Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan. During the period of high growth in the
1950s and 1960s, government revenue continued to record automatic increases,
so that the financing of priority projects was easily incorporated in the
budgeting practice of incrementalism.
64. Underlying the successful development of Japan's postwar economy was
the level of technical and managerial development that had already been
achieved over the eighty-year period since the time of the Meiji
Restoration. The postwar economic reforms broadened the basis of growth by
eliminating the control on industry by zaibatsu groups (through the
dissolution of zaibatsu groups and the breaking up of monoplies), and by
improving the economic conditions of workers and farmers (through the
authorization of labor unions and land reform). A huge backlog of advanced
technologies were available to be imported and applied in a wide range of
industries. Thus, both the supply-side and demand-side conditions for dynamic
competition were present at the start of the postwar period. Industrial and
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macroeconomic policies added further impetus to private investment and now and
then also applied restraints on it.
65. Various types of parallel growth occurred during the postwar
period. The virtuous circle involving export and investment has already been
mentioned. In most cases, the initial impetus to investment came from rapidly
expanding domestic markets, which grew in parallel with export demand. As for
the organizational structure of the industrial sector, there developed a
mutually reinforcing pattern of growth between large-scale and small-scale
enterprises, many of which had subcontracting arrangements. Parallel growth
between large-scale assemblers and small-scale manufacturers of parts and
components, for example, was evident in a broad range of machinery industries
as well as in textile industries, where large-scale producers of intermediate
goods organized small-scale industries for final labor-intensive processes.
66. The contribution of small-scale manufacturers of parts and components
to the overall development of the machinery and electronics industries is well
documented. Here, again, the prewar heritage of technical and managerial
expertise on the part of small manufacturers must be emphasized. At the time,
however, a series of MITI-sponsored programs for the modernization and
reorganization of small-scale industries were instrumental in increasing
productivity and improving quality control. The machinery industries
constitute the fastest growing branches of manufacturing in the 1950s and
1960s. Because of their relatively high labor intensity, they generated rapid
growth in the demand for labor. Nonetheless, disparities were present in the
productivity and wages of large-scale and small-scale industries during the
early phases of postwar growth. Because of the ensuing technological
development in small-scale industries, however, the dual structure of Japan's
industrial sector eventually disappeared.
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67. The protection and promotion cf infAnt Ltr!ei Japan
not only helped to turn import-substituting industries into export industries,
but were also instrumental in building a broadly based industrial structure
within the unified and modernized national economy. These achievements stand
out in sharp contrast to the disappointing experiences of many other
developing countries on the road to industrialization after World War II. Is
Japan's success transferable? To answer this question we have to discuss some
untold parts of the success story.
68. Japan's prewar heritage of accumulated production experience is not
the only factor at the base of its economic success. Japan's heritage of
strong institutional and group traditions also greatly affected the efficacy
of policy formulation and implementation. Governmental leadership, for
example, had spearheaded industrial development from the time of the early
Meiji. The comprehensive system of control and regulation of industries
established prior to and during World War II further strengthened the
government's power over all aspects of industrial activities. The smooth
interaction of government and business is a result of long-established
traditions that also provided a solid organizational basis for Japan's
successful bottom-up approach to the formulation and implementation of
industrial policy.
69. These traditions influenced the behavior of the private sector as
well. Trade associations, for example, had been mobilized in the past for the
allocation of production quotas and for the collection and compilation of
industry-related information and statistics. This method of collaboration
among private businesses under governmental supervision was carried over to
the postwar period almost intact. If Japan's bottom-up approach is to be
adopted by other nations, then they will first have to strengthen their
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administrative infrastructure in terms of collecting information and
establishing close ties between business and goverument.
70. The question of whether one country's experience in managing
development can be transferred to another is difficult to answer in general
terms. At least, some basic considerations can be pointed out in evaluating
the transferability of the Japanese experience:
* Periods of rapid industrial growth tend to produce increasing
disparities in income between industry and agriculture and, within given
industries, between the modern (large-scale) sector and the traditional
(small-scale) sector. In the case of postwar Japan, the government took
corrective measures to prevent actual income disparities from becoming too
great by supporting the price of rice to maintain farm income and by providing
various forms of assistance to small business. In developing economies, the
problems associated with a "dual structure" seem to be more prevalent in the
early stages of development. In many circumstances, it would be wrong to
equate economic development with the promotion of heavy and chemical
industries.
* Japan, with a population of 100 million and with household income
equitably distributed, had a large and rapidly growing domestic market after
the war. It was large enough to accommodate oligopolists with technically
efficient scale and was growing rapidly enough to keep those oligopolists in
competition, rather than collusion, with each other. The dynamism of private
industries under protection seems to have been greatly enhanced under the
competitive oligopolistic structure, which combined economies of scale and
competitive incentives. Developing economies that lack a domestic market of
sufficient size will have to face a tradeoff between scale economies and
competitive industrial structure.
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* Macroeconomic stability was never a serioums prob^m duri-4 g the period
of high growth in postwar Japan. Although the growth of investment caused
recurrent balance of payments difficulties, contractory financial policies
were adopted on such occasions, and the temporary slowdown in investment
quickly produced improvements in external balance. Inflation was never a
serious problem, either. The long-term effects of investment (that is,
improved productivity and increased growth of output) helped to stabilize the
process of capital accumulation by improving the balance of payments position
(through import substitution and export expansion), and by realizing price
stability (through reduced production costs and expanded supply capacities).
Investment activities thus eliminated macroeconomic constraints on further
economic growth, which rapidly became self-reinforcing.
71. Whenever developing countries find themselves up against serious
macroeconomic problems in the form of accelerating inflation or the
accumulation of external debt, they will have to face the difficult task of
stabilizing the economy without damaging its growth potential. In countries
more susceptible to macroeconomic disturbance than Japan, demand management
may require greater attention.
Korea's Experience in Managing Development
through Planning, Policymaking, and Budgeting
Kwang Suk Kim
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Abstract
ThiR paper presents Korea's experiennn in -'nApri -- o
through planning, policymaking and budgeting over the past two decades.
First, the characteristics of the planning organizations, including the
Economic Planning Board, the Office and Planning and Management under each
ministry, and Ad Hoc Committees, and their evolution over time are first dealt
with. Second, the process of plan formulation was discussed by specifying the
respective roles of each planning organization, and of foreign and domestic
exports. Third, the Korean system of annual planning, which serves as a
device for effective implementation of a medium-term plan, and its evolution
over time are examined. Fourth, the government budgetary process and the role
of budgeting in plan implementation are discussed. Fifth, the formulation and
implementation of the short-term economic management policy, which may or may
not be tied in with the implementation of a medium-term plan, is discussed.
Sixth, the Korean system of performance monitoring and evaluation is examined,
placing emphasis on the current system. Finally, lessons that emerge from the
Korean experience are presented for other developing countries as well as for
Korea's future development.
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I. Introduction
l. the Republic of Korea (hereafter, simply Korea) has developed at an
extraordinarily rapid rate since adopting its First Five-Year Plan in 1961.
This economic success is widely believed to be the result of outstanding
government management that used development planning as its tool, along with
sensible policies and budgets. Like many other market-oriented developing
countries, Korea turned to development planning after World War II in the hope
of accelerating the growth and structural transformation of its economy.
Although its initial attempts to formulate a medium-term development plan
during the reconstruction period (1953-60) following the Korean War were
unsuccessful, things changed thereafter. 1/ From 1962 to 1966 it implemented
the First Plan and since then has completed three additional plans, the last
being the Fourth Five-Year Plan of 1976-81. It is currrently implementing its
Fifth Five-Year Economic Plan (1982-86).
2. Actual development, at least in macroeconomic terms, in general
exceeded original targets up to the time of the Third Plan (1972-76). During
the latter part of the Fourth Plan (1976-81), economic performance did not
meet plan targets for the first time, mainly because of the effects of the
second world oil crisis and the domestic political instability that followed
President Park Chung Hee's assassination. Before the late 1970s, however,
Korea experienced rapid growth and structural change for nearly two decades.
3. To what extent the performance of management, as against the plans
themselves, influenced Korea's economic development of the 1960s and 1970s has
not yet been determined. Although a number of studies have already examined
Korea's development experience, most have primarily reviewed the evolution of
its proposals for development and evaluated the resulting achievements. Few
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_tuds have Investigated the contribution of management to KorePas
development. Thus, this paper takes up the question of management's
effectiveness by analyzing development planning, policymaking, and budgeting
procedures in Korea over the period 1960-80. As well, some lessons are
identified that may help to guide Korea and other countries in their future
development efforts. The discussion is based both on personal observations
and on those of former development managers in Korea.
II. Agencies Responsible for Planning
4. The first point to make is that Korea (population 38.1 million in
1980) is run by a highly centralized government. Although the country is
divided into four special cities (Seoul, Pusan, Taegue, and Inchon) and nine
provinces for the purpose of local administration, the heads of all levels of
local government are directly appointed by the central government. Local
autonomy was briefly in effect during the late 1950s and early 1960s, but it
was abolished by the military government in 1961 and has been avoided since
then. As a result, Korea's local governments have been no more than agents
empowered to carry out the decisions of the central government.
5. As is often the case in developing countries with a presidential
system, the executive branch has been the dominant power of the three
(executive, legislative, and judiciary) branches of the central government.
The executive branch is composed of the prime minister and twenty functional
ministries supporting the presidency. 2/ Within this group, development
planning is handled by the Economic Planning Board (EPB), which is actually a
super ministry in the sense that its minister is concurrently a deputy prime
minister.
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Economic Planning Board
6. The EPB was organized in 1961 to supersede the Ministry of
Construction (which had previously adopted the main functions of the former
Ministry of Reconstruction), and to absorb the Bureau of Budget from the
Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of Statistics from the Ministry of Home
Affairs. Thus, in the beginning, the EPB was responsible for government
budgeting and statistical functions in addition to the development planning
and foreign cooperation activities that had been administered by the former
Ministry of Reconstruction. Since that time, its functions have expanded
significantly. At present the EPB is also responsible for price policy, fair
trade administration, investment project appraisal, and monitoring and
evaluation of performance, in addition to the initial functions of development
planning, budgeting, and statistical work. The functions of foreign
cooperation and investment promotion, however, have been transferred to the
Ministry of Finance. Since the minister of EPB is a deputy prime minister and
has budgetary control over the ministries, the board is considered to have
appropriate institutional power to carry out its function of economic planning
and policy coordination.
Bureau of Economic Planning
7. Within the EPB, the actual responsibility for development planning
activities falls on the Bureau of Economic Planning. It is headed by a
director-general and consists of seven divisions: Overall Planning,
Industrial Planning, Investment Planning, Social Development Planning, Foreign
Cooperation Planning, Financial Planning, and Economic Analysis. Although the
internal organization of this bureau has been adjusted somewhat since its
establishment in 1961, its basic functions seem to have undergone little
substantial change.
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Office of Plannin adnment
8. The EPB is a central planning organization, but it cannot prepare and
implement a development plan without the collaboration of the functional
ministries. Each ministry participates in planning through its Office of
Planning and Management, which is a higher level organization than the bureaus
that report directly to the minister. Among its other administrative duties,
this office handles both development planning and budgeting for its
ministry. It is also responsible for monitoring performance and evaluating
the ministry's projects and policy measures. In a sense, the role of this
office in each ministry is similar to that of the EPB in the central
government. The EPB and each ministry's office of Planning and Management,
then, are the permanent organizations responsible for development planning in
Korea. They issue the guidelines to be used in formulating a development
plan. The actual preparation of a development plan, however, is handled by
the many ad hoc committees organized to support the regular activities of
these organizations.
Ad hoc Committees
9. When the First Five-Year Plan was hurriedly prepared by Korea's
military government in 1961, no formal working committees had been
organized. During the formulation of the Second Plan, a number of industry
committees were organized to help prepare sectoral plans. These committees
consisted of competent ministry officials, the employees of development banks
and other financial institutions, private industry experts, and EPB staff.
Similar ad hoc groups drafted sectoral plans for the third phase of
development. From that time, the number of work groups steadily increased,
from fourteen for the Third Plan to twenty-seven for the Fifth Plan. 3/ Each
group was usually chaired by a high-ranking official from the appropriate
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ministry and consisted of staff from that ministry, EPB staff (as a
secretariat), and selected experts and specialists from many nongovernmental
organizations, including various industrial associations, financial
institutions, research institutes, and universities.
10. Since the time of the Second Plan, these committees or work groups
have come under the direction of two or more higher level ad hoc committees.
That is, the higher level committees review and approve the guidelines for
plan formulation prepared by the EPB, as well as the draft plan and policy
directions prepared by the work groups. The first two such committees, formed
for the Second Plan, were called the Economic Plan Consultation Committee and
the Combined Meeting for Formulation of the Second Plan. Three such
committees worked on the Third Plan: the Plan Working Committee, Plan
Coordination Committee, and Plan Deliberation Committee. The Plan Working
Committee was made up of the vice-minister of the EPB as chairman, vice-
ministers of all other ministries, directors of semi-independent government
agencies (such as the Office of National Tax and the Office of Forestry), and
experts and representatives from selected nongovernmental organizations. The
Plan Coordination Committee, which was chaired by the deputy prime minister,
consisted of all ministers from economic ministries, renowned economists, and
foreign planning advisers; the Plan Deliberation Committee, chaired by the
prime minister, consisted mainly of ministers, a representative from the
political party in power, and heads or representatives of selected
nongovernmental organizations, including financial institutions, business
associations, the press, major universities, and research institutes.
11. For the Fourth Plan, the ad hoc committee had the same members as the
Plan Working Committee for the Third Plan, but the group was renamed the Plan
Coordination Committee. In this way, the committee that was similar to the
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Plan Coordination Corinit- e for the Third Plarn was elimin-ated. T-he Plan
Deliberation Committee, by contrast, has remained unchanged since the Third
Plan and is the supreme committee for the deliberation and final approval of a
plan. In some respects, it acts merely as a rubber stamp, placing its
approval on the final guidelines and the development plan, since any
disagreements are supposed to have already been ironed out through discussion
in the Plan Coordination Committee.
III. Plan Formulation
12. The hastily prepared First Five-Year Plan (1962-66) was actually a
revision of the Five-year Economic Plan that had been prepared earlier but not
finalized by the deposed Democratic party government. When the Chang Myon
government was preparing this plan, it invited Charles Wolf, Jr., of the Rand
Corporation to act as foreign consultant. The plan subsequently adopted by
the military government, however, was completed without much help from foreign
experts. Staff of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
stationed in Korea were not consulted, for example, because diplomatic
relations with the United States had significantly deteriorated immediately
following the military coup in Korea. Since the time that the Second Plan was
prepared, the process of formulation has gradually become institutionalized,
but foreign consultants are invited to assist in the early stages.
Stages of Planning
13. The formulation of a five-year plan generally takes about twenty-six
months. This time period includes six months for the initial preparation and
six months for writing up and publishing the final plan. Obviously, then, the
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preparation of a new development plan has to begin at least twenty-six months
ahead of the starting period of the plan.
14. First Stage: Draft Guidelines. During the first stage of
preparation, the main work is done by EPB's Bureau of Economic Planning
(BEP). First, it reviews the existing bodies designated for plan
formulation. At the same time, it surveys external economic prospects and
alternative macroeconomic projections for the new plan period. As a result of
this review, one or more new presidential decrees may be issued concerning the
organization of ad hoc committees and work groups. In line with the new
decrees, various ad hoc committees and work groups are then organized through
the formal appointment of ex-officio and other nongovernmental members to each
committee and work group.
15. Next, the EPB prepares a draft of guidelines for formulation of a new
plan, which are based on its analysis and preliminary projections of the
economy. These guidelines usually include: a survey of external economic
conditions and emerging issues for the Korean economy; preliminary fundamental
goals of the new plan; preliminary macroeconomic targets (or indicators) and
main policy directions; and the statistical basis for and time schedule of
plan formulation. While the EPB is preparing these guidelines, the Planning
Ministry examines some alternative goals, targets, and policy directions for
the plan with the help of foreign and domestic consultants. 4/ Before the
Fifth Plan, the draft guidelines were prepared almost entirely within the
EPB. During the formulation of the Fifth Plan, however, and before the plan
guidelines were completed, the EPB and the Korea Development Institute (KDI)
jointly held a series of public conferences to present and discuss the likely
issues and alternative targets and policy directions of the plan. Many
experts and representatives of both government and nongovernment organizations
were invited to present their opinions at these meetings.
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16. In any case, wnen a draft of the guidelines is compnhtAa hy the EPB,
it is submitted first to the Vice-Ministerial Committee of Plan Coordination
and then to the Ministerial Committee of Plan Deliberation for final
approval. This process has been in place since the time of the Fourth Plan.
The proposed guidelines are usually discussed at length by the coordination
committee, which often makes some modifications after the committee hearing.
The modified guidelines are then usually accepted by the Plan Deliberation
Committee without further comment or suggestions for change. The approved
guidelines are reported to the formal cabinet meeting and then to the
president before being sent out to the various ministries.
17. Second Stage: Sectoral Plans. After the EPB transmits the plan
guidelines to all government ministries and semi-independent agencies, the ad
hoc industry committees or work groups begin work on the sectoral plans. 5/
At this stage, some members of each work group tour selected foreign countries
to obtain details of planning experiences there. The preparation of sectoral
or ministry plans has changed significantly since the Third Plan was
formulated. Before then, each industry committee assisting in the preparation
of industrial sector plans was chaired by a member of the EPB's planning
staff; thus, ministry officials and other members of each committee seemed
merely to be supporting the EPB's planning effort. Since then, each work
group has been headed by the assistant minister (or the director-general in
some exceptional cases) of the ministry concerned, so that the group is now
actually responsible for developing the ministry or sectoral plan. The change
in attitude of most ministry officials toward the planning effort suggests
that significant decentralization of planning has taken place in Korea since
the Third Plan was formualted.
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18. Each work group since then has prepared a sectoral or ministry plan
on the basis of the EPB's guidelines for plan formulation. Whereas the
guidelines provide only preliminary macroeconomic indicators (including the
major industry growth rates and the magnitude of available investment
resources), the sectoral plans prepared by the work groups usually outline
investment programs far exceeding the available resources. The EPB therefore
prepares an alternative program of investment requirements based on an input-
output planning model and distributes it to the various work groups, which are
encouraged to develop a more reasonable investment program.
19. Third Stage: Planning Coordination. When the Third Plan was
formulated, each work group's draft plan was submitted to the Plan Working
Committee for review and adjustment. At the time of the Fourth Plan, the
EPB's Planning Bureau was responsible for coordinating all plan proposals of
the work groups in the course of plan consolidation. It seemed easier for the
EPB to take on this task since it had already provided each work group with
detailed planning guidelines. Nevertheless, considerable discussion took
place between the EPB and the relevant ministry staff at this stage of the
Fourth Plan. At the time of the Fifth Plan, each work group's proposal was
presented at a public conference held at the KDI in order to solicit comments
from experts and other interested groups. Afterward, the EPB coordinated and
adjusted the ministry proposals on the basis of these comments. 6/
20. By coordinating the work groups and adjusting the sectoral plans, the
EPB is able to consolidate these plans into a national development plan. That
draft is then submitted to the Plan Coordination Committee for review and
approval. It can be revised if the committee finds it necessary, but no
significant revision has yet been made to the draft plan as a result of
discussion at the Plan Coordination Committee. This stage of planning ends
with the committee's approval.
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21. Fourth stage! Finalization. At this EFER t'e  p -h
figures of the macroeconomic plan on the basis of the newly released national
income account estimates by the Bank of Korea. Then the main features of the
plan are formally submitted to a meeting of the cabinet and finally to the
president for his approval and promulgation. The Planning Bureau now has to
complete the writing of a formal plan for publication.
Role of Foreign and Domestic Experts
22. As mentioned earlier, the First Five-Year Plan was formulated by
Korean bureaucrats and economists without significant help from foreign
experts. The Second Plan, meanwhile, was prepared by the EPB in close
collaboration with the USAID mission and other foreign advisory groups
stationed in Korea (both the Nathan Advisory Group supported by USAID and the
West German planning adviser had offices in the EPB building). USAID/Korea
provided further assistance through its economic staff and also invited short-
term planning consultants from abroad to participate. Since the EPB did not
have many experienced planners at this time, the foreign advisers were
involved in almost all important aspects of plan formulation. Thus, the
Second Plan was actually a joint product of both the Korean government and the
foreign advisers.
23. Fewer foreign advisers participated in formulating the Third Plan.
Although a number of renowned foreign economists provided short-term advisory
services, only one foreign planning adviser (Larry Westphal) to the EPB was
stationed in Korea. The former assisted with plan strategies, while the
latter helped with modeling tasks. At the same time, the EPB hired three
domestic planning consultants (including Mahn Je Kim) to help with the Third
Plan.
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24. Since the Fourth Plan, no foreign adviser has been stationed in
Korea, although a number have been short-term conisultants. Instead, the Korea
Development Institute (established in 1971) has provided domestic consulants
on many important aspects of planning. Many short-term foreign consultants
supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Technical
Assistance Fund have advised EPB on selected, narrow topics. 7/ The use of
foreign expertise has obviously declined since the formulation of the Second
Plan, whereas the use of domestic expertise has been on the increase. In
other words, an import substitution of planning advisory services has
gradually taken place in Korea, particularly since the establishment of the
KDI. At the same time, the planning process has not only been gradually
decentralized, but it has also involved wider participation by people in both
government and nongovernment circles.
IV. Plan Implementation--Role of Annual Planning
25. A five-year plan generally consolidates all programs to be
implemented during the entire plan period. The implementation of the plan
year by year, however, necessitates the preparation of an annual plan. The
role of the government budget in plan implementation is probably better known
than the role of annual planning. As Albert Waterston (1965, page 203) has
pointed out,
an annual plan is much broader in scope than a
conventional administrative budget, which is almost
always limited to the domestic funds required for general
government activities ... An annual plan is mostly
concerned in broad outline with objectives, priorities
for the use of resources and expected outputs from
proposed inputs of physical, human and financial
resources.
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26. Korea did not have a svstem of -annul Dlanning AiTrin-a the _-_-st
Plan. That plan had to be totally revised midway in order to comply with the
severe international criticism that it had set overambitious targets. There
was, however, no formal annual plan to facilitate the implementation of the
revised plan. The actual performance of the economy slighly exceeded the main
targets of the ambitious original plan. This performance was therefore not
really the result of implementing the revised plan.
Overall Resource Budget
27. A formal system of annual planning was introduced in Korea beginning
with the Second Five-Year Plan. The annual plan, which was known as the
Overall Resource Budget (ORB), was prepared to facilitate the yearly
implementation of the Second Plan. The ORB was to review and evaluate the
plan performance in the preceding years. It was then to revise, if necessary,
major policy directions and the list of projects to be implemented, as well as
macroeconomic forecasts for the year in view of changing economic
conditions. The annual plan was not only supposed to provide guidelines for
formulating an annual government budget, but it was also expected to reflect
government policy regarding private sector economic activities.
28. The ORB system was slightly modified during the Third Plan so that it
would both facilitate yearly implementation of the large plan and be an aid in
the preparation of an overall rolling plan. In other words, the ORB became a
means of updating various projections and of revising plan targets and policy
directions for the entire plan period. Beginning in 1978, however, the name
of the annual plan was changed from the ORB to the Economic Management Plan to
reflect the true nature of the annual plan in Korea.
29. The original title, ORB, implied that the annual plan was intended to
cover the allocation of all available resources, including private
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investments, since it had the characteristics of a comprehensive plan. With
the Third Plan, plannirLg began to emphasize policy rather than allocation, so
that it was no longer necessary for the annual plan to include a comprehensive
list of investment programs to be implemented during the year. ORB was
therefore not really an appropriate title for the annual plan after the Second
Plan period. The name was not changed, however, until the Fourth Plan period.
Economic Management Plan (EMP)
30. The successor to ORB presents economic projections and policy
guidelines that are applicable for at least two years. It does not provide a
detailed list of projects to be undertaken by the private sector, but it does
include details of the government's budget as well as all public investment
outlays.
31. The EMP for a plan year is normally issued after it has been
finalized in January, but its preparation starts early in the preceding
year. The first step is to work out the macroeconomic indicators for the
coming year. That task is undertaken by the EPB's Bureau of Economic Planning
vith the technical help of the KDI. It is usually completed by June or July
at the latest and submitted to the Economic Ministers Consultation Meeting 8/
for review. After the indicators are accepted at this meeting, they are sent
out to all ministers, including the Ministry of Finance, which use the figures
in preparing their management plan and budget estimates. Since guidelines for
formulation of the new year's budget (which have already been submitted to the
ministries by EPB's Bureau of Budget) do not contain detailed macroeconomic
projections, this bureau, too, has to use the macroindicators in estimating
the feasible levels of total government investment and loan programs for the
coming year. Thus, a large part of the new year's budget is based on the
macroindicators prepared for the EMP.
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32. T'n ne w year's budget is usually approved hy t-h National A.s cmbly by
December 1 of the preceding year. The Ministry of Finance is also required to
prepare and finalize a new year's foreign exchange demand and supply program
by this date. The EPB Planning Bureau consolidates the finalized budget and
foreign exchange program in its formulation of the EMP. The Planning Bureau
also consults with various ministries in December to coordinate sectoral
programs and policies for the coming year. During the formulation of the EMP,
important EMP proposals are often reported to the economic staff of the Blue
House (office of the president) for review. The EPB has to complete the EMP
by early January and submit it to the Economic Ministers Consultation Meeting
for approval. Once approved, it is reported to the president through a
regular cabinet meeting. Then it is published and distributed to all
government ministries and offices for implementation.
33. Although the EMP is formally issued in the first quarter of the year,
it may be revised by the EPB during the year, if necessary. The macroeconomic
indicators of the EMP for the second half of the year are often revised on the
basis of the economic performance in the first half. This revision can easily
be reviewed by the Economic Ministers Consultation Meeting, which is held
about twice a week.
34. Annual planning procedures in Korea seem to have changed little since
annual planning was first adopted in 1967, except the name of the annual plan
has changed from ORB to EMP. The system has apparently helped to keep the
annual government budget and other major programs in line with the goals of
each five-year plan. However, since Korea's annual plan is prepared by the
Planning Bureau without much collaboration of the ministries, it lacks the
details of sectoral programs that are to be undertaken by the private sector
without government support. It resembles a forecast more than a formal plan
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since it can be readily revised in the course of a year. Nevertheless, annual
planning has been an effective means of disseminating government plans and
policies that are regularly updated in the light of changing economic
conditions. In addition, the consolidation of the government's annual budget
and its other programs into the framework of the annual plan has provided the
ministries and the general public with a single source of information on all
major government policies and programs.
V. Plan Implementation--Role of Budgeting
35. The role of the budget in plan implementation cannot be understood
without some idea of budget size and development expenditures. In other
words, implementation greatly depends on the resources that are mobilized and
allocated through the budget.
36. Overall, the role of the government in Korea's economy has been
expanding since the early 1960s (Table 1). At that time, total government
expenditures, including local government expenditures, were unusually high
relative of GNP, then declined to 16.3 percent of GNP in 1966, and thereafter
rose steadily until they reached 22 percent by 1980. The national tax burden
has also increased from slightly more than 10 percent of GNP in the early
1960s to 17.4 percent by 1980. In that same period, roughly 23-30 percent of
government expenditures have been allocated for government investment and
loans (which accounted for nearly 30 percent of gross domestic fixed
investment, if the unusual years of 1962 and 1980 are excluded.) These
figures, along with the other indicators appearing in Table 1, all point to
the relative importance of the government sector in Korea.
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Table 1 Selected Indicators of the X*4* of Government in Korean's Ecouomy
1962 1966 1971 1976 19S
Total government expenditures
(including local government and
special accounts)/GNP 20.6 a/ 16.3 b/ 18.3 20.7 22.0
National tax burden/GNP 10.6 10.7 15.0 17.4 17.4
Government investment and loans/ 22.6 127.1 29.1 29.7 27.4
total government expenditures
Government investment and loans/ 55.9 29.8 28.7 27.1 19.J
gross domestic fixed investment
Investment of government and government
enterprises/gross domestic investeent 19.3 '/ 22.0 23.3 19.5 17.7 J/
Total public investment (including
government-invested enterprise/gross
domestic investment 40.9 c/ 32.6 40.0 36.7 36.3 4/
Savings of government and government 27.4 c/ 25.5 22.6 24.2 18.7 jI
enterprises/gross domestic savings
Total public savings (including
government-invested enterprises)/gross
domestic savings 31.6 c/ 30.6 24.2 28.5 22.7 Al
a/ Figures for 1960.
b/ Figures.for 1965.
c/ Figures for 1963.
T/ Figures for 1979.
Sources: I1 SaKong, "The Role of Goverment in Economic Development," Korea
Development Review (Spring 1981), pp. 2-23 (in Korean). Chongkee
Park, "National Budget and publlic Finance," Korean Development Review
(Autumn 1981) (in Korean).
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37. The classification of budgetary accounts has changed somewhat since
the early 1960s. The central government now maintains a general account and
eighteen special accounts. Of these, the general account has been the most
important in Korea. It covered about 90 percent of all central government
budget expenditures on a net basis in 1981, excluding the special accounts of
government enterprises. The general account also finances most development
expenditures in Korea (Economic Planning Board 1981). Since development
expenditures by local government have been almost negligible, the general
account of the central government is the main source of funds for the
implementation of Korea's five-year plans. This discussion therefore focuses
em the formulation of the budget for this account and the disbursement of the
funds it contains.
Yteparing the Budget
38. Budgetary administration in Korea is handled by the EPB, which is
also responsible for development planning. The Bureau of Budget (BOB) under
the BPS is responsible for budgetmaking in Korea. The budgetary cycle begins
at the end of February each year, when the ministries submit new project
proposals as well as the existing major pregasm for the fiscal year to the
ftP. The BOB then evaluates the feasibility of these proposals. At the same
time, the EPB must prepare its guidelines for the formulation of the new
year's budget and transmit them to the heads of all ministries and independent
agencies of the central government by the end of March (that is, after they
hav* been approved by the cabinet mesting aad finally by the president).
Along with the budget guidelines, the BPS hos to provide the ministries with
the format for budget estimates, the classification methods for revenue and
expenditure budgets, and the other basic information required to formulate the
budget, including the standard pay scale for government employees, the unit
prIcs of major expenditure itess, and so oa.
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:34- The m!nistrts r a n4 e3eidenLe agen_c4 of the ceiLiLi government
start working on the budget as soon as they receive the EPB's budget
guidelines. They have about two months to prepare their budget estimates and
must submit them to the EPB at least by the end of May.
40. Between early June and late August, the BOB evaluates and adjusts the
budget estimates submitted by the ministries. By early September, the EPB has
to finalize its own proposals for the new year's budget and have them approved
by the deputy prime minister. During September, the EPB reports its overall
budget proposals with the political party in power. ,Then the executive
branch's proposal is reviewed by the cabinet meeting and approved by the
president. The executive branch proposal has to be submitted to the National
Assembly at least by October 2, that is, ninety days before the beginning of a
new fiscal year (the same as the calendar year in Korea). The National
Assembly has a period of two months in which to deliberate on the budget
estimates. (Since 1981, the budget estimates have been directly submitted to
the Ways and Means Committee of the National Assembly without prior
deliberation by each standing committee.) The national assembly has to pass
the new year's budget by December 1.
41. When the budget is finally approved by the National Assembly, the
ministries have to submit their requests for budget allotments by program to
the EPB; they must also submit both their monthly revenue collection program
and monthly budgetary payment program to the Ministry of Finance (MOF). On
the basis of these programs, the MOF then prepares a consolidated monthly
government financing program for EPB. In turn, EPB prepares a quarterly
program of budget allotments and submits it to the cabinet together with the
monthly financing program. When these two programs are finally approved by
the president, the EPB makes a quarterly budget allotment for the ministries,
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while the MOF notifies the ministries of the monthly ceiling of each
mzLuiusLy's paymen.ts. 
_sea buAgetary and financial allotments are usually
completed by early January, so that the ministries may start to make budgetary
obligations and payments from that time.
42. This brief outline indicates that a critical step in the budgetary
process in Korea is the BOB's evaluation of the budget estimates submitted by
the ministries. Since the sum of the ministries' budget estimates usually far
exceeds the total budget determined by the EPB, the BOB's budget evaluation
calls for cutting the budget estimates. According to an EPB source
(Byong-Il Kim 1981), the BOB's evaluation is divided into four categories:
defense expenditures, current administrative expenses, current program
expenses, and development expenditures. The criteria of budgetary evaluation
vary within each category. In the case of the development expenditures, the
EPB bases its evaluation on the assessment it made of the project proposals
submitted earlier by the ministries (see paragraph 38). It attempts to
analyze the economic feasibility study of each new project, and reexamines the
annual expenditure programs for existing projects. In the BOB's evaluation,
of course, the projects specified in the five-year plan are given some
priority, but not without prior evaluation. In the case of large projects,
the BOB uses the results of project appraisals conducted by the Bureau of
Economic Planning and, more recently, by the Bureau of Investment Appraisal.
Structure of the Budget.
43. In its budget, Korea allocates funds both to programs and projects
and to line items (categorized by object-class). The budget is structured in
the following order: agency, chapter, section, item, subitem, and object-
class. "Agency" refers to each ministry or independent agency. "Chapter"
usually indicates function, while "section" refers to the character of the
- 62 -
expenditure or the program. An "item" denotes the interagency oran' i tion or
the project. A "subitem" represents a subproject. Finally, the "object-
class" represents the type of expenditures: personal expenses, the purchases
of goods and services, current transfers, capital outlays, loans and equity
subscription, repayment of borrowings, intragovernment transfer, other
expenses, and contingency funds. Any diversion of budget expenditures above
the level of item cannot be authorized without the prior approval of the
National Assembly. Ministries can, however, divert funds between subitems ant
between object-classes within the limits set by the EPB or with the prior
approval of the EPB minister.
44. For development expenditures related to the implementation of a five-
year plan, the budget is organized around development programs (section) and
projects (items). The Korean government attempted to adopt a system of
program and performance budgeting in the first half of the 1960s, but this
system was not pursued after the mid-1960s. Development budgets have been
organized by program and project since that time. Under this system, five-
year plan projects can easily be matched to budget categories.
45. At the time of the Second Plan, the Korean government made a serious
effort to ensure that its planned projects received necessary support. Since
then, however, no separate work of this nature has been done because the
emphasis in development planning has shifted from comprehensive planning to
policy planning. Plan documents, therefore, need not list all the projects to
be implemented during a plan period, nor do they have to specify the project
expenditure by year. Consequently, plan projects are not automatically
included in the annual budget.
46. Nonetheless, it is generally believed that most development projects
requiring government financing have been taken into account in annual budgets,
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at least until the late 1970s. First, the ministries suggesting the projects
obviously are eager to carry them out and will include them in the ministry
budget estimates. Although a ministry's budget estimates may be cut and some
projects eliminated during BOB's evaluation, the BOB usually gives some
priority to development projects. Second, up to the late 1970s the level of
fiscal resources available for annual development budgets was generally much
greater than envisioned in the five-year plans, the reason being that the
economy had grown more rapidly than anticipated. With increased resources for
its development expenditures, the government not only found it relatively easy
to accommodate most of the plan projects in the budget, but it could even
undertake many additional projects that were not included in the original
plan.
47. Beginning in 1980, however, the situation changed as economic
performance could no longer meet the original targets of the five-year plan.
Today, plan projects do not automatically receive budget support, but a new
device has evolved to provide plan projects with the necessary budget
support: medium-term fiscal planning, which was adopted for use with Korea's
Fifth Plan (1982-86). Its purpose is to improve the single-year budgeting
system by preparing a medium-term plan for mobilizing and allocating
government resources. Even without such planning, the government was able to
accommodate most plan projects in the annual budget, and practically no
projects that were economically and technically feasible were dropped from the
budget. Furthermore, almost no such projects have had to be suspended in the
middle of implementation because funds were not available to complete the
projects, as has often happened in other developing countries. There are two
reasons for this. First, as already mentioned, the Korean government could
easily accommodate the planned projects because resources had increased.
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Senone, the gov-ernment gave priority in budgetary allocation to ong.nig
projects. Despite its somewhat rigid approach to budgeting, the government
has continuously paid close attention to the completion of projects already
underway.
48. The first medium-term fiscal plan was prepared early in 1982 on the
basis of the ministries' Fifth Plan project proposals. It called for more
realistic estimates of government expenditures than levels projected in the
Fifth Plan. Under this new system, the fiscal plan is to be a rolling plan
during the Fifth Plan period. In other words, it will be revised by May of
each year in accordance with Korea's recent economic performance and the new
outlook for fiscal revenues. Thus, it will serve as a basis for the detailed
annual budgets of the next year, and thereby ensure that projects envisioned
in the Fifth Plan receive due budgetary provision. 9/
VI. Formulation and Implementation
of Short-term Economic Management Policy
49. The change from comprehensive planning to policy planning in Korea
came about because the government found it could not plan and at the same time
directly allocate all national resources in a market-oriented economy. The
government's present approach to development planning is important for the
private sector mainly in the sense that it discloses the future direction of
government policy on the allocation of resources and the consequent economic
outlook. Of greater concern to the private sector has been the government's
short-term economic management policy, which may or may not be tied in with
the implementation of a medium-term plan. In either case, a short-term policy
can directly influence decisionmaking in the business sector.
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50. Short-term government policy may apply to aggregate demand
management, taxes, exchange rates, interest rates, preferential credit, farm
prices, industrial promotion and other such matters. Some of these policies
may involve discretionary execution by the government, while others may not.
51. Short-term economic policy is normally initiated or designed by the
officials of the ministry concerned. For instance, short-term proposals that
have to do with aggregate demand management, taxation, exchange rates, and
interest rates are normally prepared by the Ministry of Finance in
consultation with the central bank and other related ministries. Farm price
policy is, of course, the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries. These policy proposals have to be reviewed by and coordinated with
the related government agencies. Before the president's final approval is
received, therefore, the proposals have to be approved at the Economic
Ministers Meeting.
52. This group is composed of the ten economic ministers and the deputy
prime minister (DPM) as chairman. 10/ The Economic Vice-Ministers Meeting,
which consists of the ten vice-ministers from the economic ministries, is
subordinate to the Economic Ministers Meeting. The Economic Ministers
Meeting, which began with the establishment of the EPB and the deputy prime
ministership, has become the formal institution for deliberation on any
ministry proposal to enact economic laws and presidential decrees or to amend
existing laws and decrees. Such proposals first have to be approved at the
Economic Vice-Ministers Meeting. In general, all concerned ministries have
already agreed upon them and they merely require the formal approval of the
ministers. As a result, few controversial proposals or policy issues are
likely to reach this formal Economic Ministers Meeting.
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53. Various important policy pronmaals that requirc coordinatii amorig
the concerned ministries are usually submitted to the Economic Ministers
Consultation Meeting for discussion. This meeting has the same membership as
the Economic Ministers Meeting, but its function is slightly different.
Officially, the consultation meeting originated in 1977 (when Duck Woo Nam was
deputy prime minister), but some people suggest that a similar institution
existed earlier under a different name. The consultation meeting is an
informal meeting of the economic ministers to discuss policy proposals or
issues for intragovernment coordination, whereas the Economic Ministers
Meeting is a formal institution to satisfy legal requirements for final
approval of the economic proposals that have already been agreed upon by the
concerned ministries. The number of controversial policy proposals has
increased in recent years owing to economic development and the increasing
complexity of economic issues; and so, the Economic Ministers Consultation
Meeting has been held more often (usually tvice a week) than the formal
Sbotomic Ministers Meeting (usually once a week).
54. Most short-term economic manageneat policies have to be submitted to
the Economic Ministers Consultation Meeting since they usually require
considerable intergovernment coordination. The proposals submitted to the
consultation meeting do not require prior approval by the Economic Vice-
Ministers Meeting. The consultation meeting apparently makes it possible for
tie deputy prime sinister (or the minister of the EPB) to coordinate major
eeonomic policies and to discourage policy proposals inconsistent with a
medium-term plan or the annual plan for economic management, since the deputy
prime minister is chairman and the EPB staff serve as the secretariat for the
meeting. 11/ In the meeting, the representatives of the Prime Minister's
.J.,r
:Q.
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Office, the Blue House, the Bank of Korea, and the Korea Development Bank
usually participate as observers.
55. There is no doubt that the Economic Ministers Consultation Meeting
plays an important role in coordinating major economic policies through an
informal and free discussion of the policy issues involved. Normally, a
policy proposal prepared by a ministry is not open to the public for
discussion. It is generally referred to related ministries and independent
agencies for comments before it is finalized as a ministry proposal. Full
agreement of the related agencies is difficult to obtain at this stage,
however, because of the competitive attitudes of bureaucrats in each
ministry. Most tend to argue for the position that best reflects their
ministry's interests. For this reason, important economic policy proposals
are usually submitted to the consultation meeting for discussion and
coordination by the ministers concerned.
56. This procedure is the standard way that economic policy is formed in
Korea. Sometimes emergency economic measures have to be taken, as they were
by the Park regime during the 1970s and by a more recent government on June 28
and July 3, 1982. 12/ In these cases, the policy proposals are not
necessarily prepared by the ministry officials concerned but may be prepared
by a small number of elite officials who have access to the top decisionmaker
and wish to promote certain ideas. If the group succeeds in persuading the
top policymaker that a certain policy should be adopted, proposals are worked
out quickly (usually secretly) and are then directly reported to the president
without going through the normal channel of the Economic Ministers
Consultation Meeting. If the president accepts the proposals, the decisions
are sent to the appropriate ministry for a formal process of cabinet approval,
announcement, and implementation.
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57. T1us- some highly important policy decisions may be made bv a small
number of bureaucrats without much discussion or policy debate by the related
government ministries. Even in normal circumstances, where policies are
discussed at the Economic Ministers Consultation Meeting, the policymaking
process really involves a relatively small number of government officials.
Although a ministry might have a special committee for the deliberation of
certain policy issues and a few private experts might participate in such
committees, the committee is believed to function as a rubber stamp that
merely approves whatever is proposed by the ministry. Korea's economic
policymaking, it can be said, appears to involve only a small number of
government officials and may produce many quick policy decisions.
58. Once those decisions are made, however, they are strongly implemented
to achieve the desired objectives. Jones and Sakong (1980, p. 79) state that
"Koreans are even better at implementation than at planning," and they suggest
that this ability essentially stems from the governmental system, which can be
characterized as a Myrdalian "hard" state. A "hard" state is one in which
policies are regularly implemented, whereas a "soft" state is one which
policies are often not implemented. 13/ According to Jones and Sakong (1980,
pp. 79-140) Myrdalian "hardness" is determined by two factors: the ability to
enforce obligations on people via compulsion, and the ability to direct
administrative discretion toward desirable ends. The Korean government's
success at implementation, a characteristic of the "hard state," is
attributable in part to the state's Confucian cultural background and in part
to the nature of authoritarian rule in Korea. In any case, there is no
question that the Korean government has the ability and willingness to carry
out its policy decisions.
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59. Problems may arise, however, when economic policies that have been
dec'ued fln a hurry by a small number of government officials are not
consistent with plan objectives or conflict with economic efficiency. In
order to accommodate this kind of situation, therefore, the Korean government
has tried to be flexible by reversing direction once a conflict becomes
evident. Even then, the government has been criticized both for its quick
policymaking and quick change of policies. In 1981, the government handled
nearly 1,000 cases of either enactments or amendments of laws and regulations,
and about 10 percent of those were revised more than twice in the same year.
Many laws and regulations have been amended because a ministry has not been
able to take into account all possible related cases, because it was concerned
only with the solution of immediate problems, or because other ministries did
not cooperate fully. 14/
60. In implementing economic policies, the government has relied not only
on field manipulation or other nondiscretionary forms of intervention, but it
has also used command when necessary. 15/ In particular, its power to control
the credit market has been used for discretionary intervention into
decisionmaking by the business sector in connection with the implementation of
economic policies. In Korea, practically all the large banks have been partly
owned and controlled by the government, while all foreign loans have been
subject to government approval and guarantee. Thus the government's
discretionary interventions in the business sector have been effective because
noncompliance with government policy could reduce or cut off the primary
sources of external finance. The government's approach has been especially
effective among business firms that have relied heavily on external support
for their capital requirements.
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61. The Korean government's reliance on both ditcrPtannry AnAd
nondiscretionary forms of intervention is not considered the bright side of
its policy implementation. It indicates, however, the government's
willingness to implement effectively its policy decisions by all means
available.
VII. Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
Previous System, 1962-81
62. Korea first introduced a formal system of monitoring and evaluating
performance in 1962, in connection with its adoption of a basic management
planning system similar to that used by the Korean military forces. All
central government agencies were required to prepare an annual basic
management plan and to submit it to the Office of Planning Coordination (which
was in the Prime Minister's Office) for coordination and consolidation before
the annual budget estimates were made for a new fiscal year. Then the central
government agencies were to prepare their annual budget estimates on the basis
of the adjusted management plan. These agencies were required, however, to
prepare and submit to the Office of Planning Coordination a revised annual
plan of management consistent with the budget approved by the National
Assembly. When the revised plan was coordinated and finally approved by the
prine minister's office, the implementation of that plan by each government
agency became the subject of performance monitoring and evaluation by the
agency itself and the Office of Planning Coordination. 16/
63. Performance monitoring and evaluation were to be carried out for all
projects and programs specified in the annual management plan, including the
economic development projects of the Five-Year Plan. Each central government
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agency was first required to monitor and evaluate the status of implementation
of its projects in quarterly reports to the Of fice of Dlan-ning Coordination=
This office was to conduct an overall evaluation of the reports by soliciting
the opinion of experts in the Economic Performance Evaluation Group (which was
made up of university professors.). The Office of Planning Coordination
conducted a quarterly analysis and evaluation of management plan
implementation and reported the results to the president in a quarterly
meeting held for this purpose. If the evaluation required agencies to take
corrective measures, the Prime Minister's Office sent out the proper
instructions to each agency.
64. The system just described was completely changed in 1981, when the
Office of Planning Coordination was abolished and a new bureau was created in
the EPB to undertake the function of performance monitoring and evaluation.
At the same time, a new system of monitoring and evaluation was instituted to
replace the annual basic management planning system, which was experiencing a
number of problems. It is widely agreed that these problems were due mainly
to inconsistencies and conflicts with the budgeting process. 17/ Since the
Office of Planning Coordination lacked power over budgetary allocations, it
simply collected the management plans of all government agencies without much
serious effort at coordinating and adjusting them. Moreover, the office could
do nothing to adjust social and economic development projects, which had to be
handled by the EPB's Bureau of Economic Planning. Many of the central
government agencies prepared annual budget estimates without even sticking to
their management plans. As a result, the management plans of ministries often
had to be substantially revised after their budgets had been approved. The
main reason for this problem was that an independent organization separate
from the EPB had the job of management planning, while the EPB did the
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economic pianning and budgeting, In th n_- Ret-up , t.at all
three related functions--economic planning, budgeting, and performance
evaluation. The new EPB bureau responsible for these tasks is called the
Bureau of Evaluation and Analysis, and it has almost forty staff members.
The New System
65. In the new system, all central government agencies (including the
Seoul city government) are required to prepare work implementation schedules
for all important policy measures and government-financed projects to be
carried out in a year. Schedules are completed early in the year after the
budget has been approved. The EPB first sends its guidelines for the
formulation of the major work implementation schedules to all government
agencies by the end of January in the year of implementation. Each agency
then prepares and submits its main work implementation schedules to the EPB by
February 20. Upon receiving the schedules of all agencies, the EPB
consolidates them and will use them as the basis for monitoring and evaluating
performance.
66. EPB also sends guidelines on performance monitoring and evaluation to
all government agencies by the end of February. Each agency is to monitor and
make a quarterly evaluation of the performance of its major works or projects
on the basis of these guidelines and is to submit the results to the EPB.
According to EPB's guidelines for 1982, each agency should reclassify its
major work programs by unit project or unit measure and specify the quarterly
schedule of implementation for each unit project. In 1982, 1,120 unit
projects were selected from all work programs of the central government's
agencies for the preparation of major work implementation schedules.
67. Of this total, the government selected 301 projects for monthly
performance monitoring and evaluation on the basis of their importance. The
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government also selected 40 major unit projects to receive special emphasis in
performance monitoring and evaluation. These projects were selected because
of the problems involved in implementation and the significant impact of such
projects on the national economy. Apart from these special projects, all
other projects are monitored and evaluated by the appropriate ministry, which
must submit the results to the EPB. The EPB, in turn, is expected to
consolidate the results so they can be reported to the president; it is also
expected to recommend necessary corrective measures on problem projects. For
the special projects, however, the EPB has to engage in performance monitoring
and evaluation directly with the help of the ministries involved.
68. According to the EPB guidelines for 1982, performance monitoring
consists of three steps: monitoring the progress of implementation, including
the status of budget executions; comparing the progress of implementation with
the schedule of project implementation for the year and the overall project
schedule; and analyzing problems causing a delay in implementation. For
performance evaluation, each government agency is asked to specify the
objective or target and the expected result of each project, including
indirect objectives and results if possible, in the major work implementation
schedules. The actual evaluation consists of: analyzing and evaluating the
economic efficiency of implementation in the light of the use of scarce
resources, including budgetary funds, manpower, and time; comparing the actual
result of each project with the planned or expected result; and determining
whether the implementation of each project is in balance with other related
projects in terms of timing and order of implementation. Finally, corrective
measures or other suggestions arising from the performance evaluation are to
be presented.
- 74 -
69. Each agency is to submit the results of its Derfnr_-_ e ".mnitoring
and evaluation to the EPB every month for projects requiring monthly
evaluation, and every quarter for other projects. For special projects, the
EPB sends out the results of its own performance evaluation to the agencies
concerned. Using the results of both their own performance evaluation and
that of the EPB, the government agencies are supposed to take whatever
measures are necessary to correct any problems. (The EPB can instruct the
agencies concerned to take action if nothing has yet been done by them.) The
EPB must also take into account the results of performance evaluation in the
allocation of the current year's budget or in the formulation of next year's
budget. In addition, the EPB is responsible for consolidating the results of
the performance evaluation (including the recommended corrective measures for
projects with problems) and for reporting these results to the cabinet twice a
year for final deliberation and approval.
70. Korea's formal system of monitoring and evaluation is supplemented by
direct presidential monitoring of major projects. During President Park's
rule, in particular, the Blue House directly monitored the implementation of
some large projects to which the president paid a great deal of attention.
The Blue House could, of course, obtain necessary information from the
ministries concerned or directly from the agencies implementing the
projects. Any problem arising in these large projects could be immediately
resolved by the president, whose decision would not be disputed by the
agencies concerned. This kind of direct performance monitoring has been on
the decline under President Chun Doo Hwan. Nonetheless, it remains the most
effective means of project implementation in Korea at present.
71. With the transfer of performance monitoring and evaluation to the
EPB, Korea's system has improved significantly. Since the EPB has at its
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disposal the strong instruments of economic planning and budgeting, it can
monitor and evaluate performanice more effectively than the former Office of
Planning Coordination under the prime minister. The EPB's adoption of this
function is expected to bring about some improvement in planning and budgeting
as well, since the results of performance evaluation can provide useful
feedback for these processes. Although the system is still new, it is an
excellent device for assuring the effective implementation of government plans
and policies in the Korean context. 18/
VIII. Lessons and Concluding Remarks
72. Korea's experience in development planning, policymaking, and
budgeting over the past two decades points up some important lessons that may
help to improve future development planning, both within and outside Korea.
* Korea's planning organization, the EPB, may be a useful model of an
effective planning agency for many developing countries. This institution is
unique in that it is responsible for development planning as well as for
budgeting and performance evaluation. In addition, since the minister of EPB
is concurrently the deputy prime minister, he can preside over the Economic
Ministers Meeting and thereby ensure effective coordination of economic plans
and policies. Any developing country that wishes to concentrate its efforts
on achieving rapid economic development will require an effective planning
organization similar to this one.
* Korea's system of annual planning, combined with its budgeting
procedures, may also be of interest to other developing countries. Korea is
able, for example, to revise or update plan targets and to reevaluate policy
directions once every year in response to changing external environments and
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internal conditions. This annual planning svstem hb ee--n bccause
it is backed by budgetary control. The link between the development plan or
annual plan and the annual budget has recently been strengthened by the
adoption of the medium-term fiscal planning system by the Bureau of Budget.
This step will further ensure successful implementation of the development
plan.
* Koreans are said to excel at implementation rather than planning and
policymaking. This ability seems rooted partly in Korea's historical and
cultural traditions and partly in its existing institutions, including the
system of performance monitoring and evaluation. Although the historical and
cultural factors are not transferable to other developing countries, Korea's
system of implementation provides an important lesson for them: that is, a
good plan produces nothing unless it is effectively implemented.
* Korea's system has one weakness that other developing countries
should avoid in their policymaking: it lacks a consensus-building
procedure. Important policy decisions are often made by a small number of
bureaucrats or government officials without much public debate or the
participation of civilian experts. Decisionmaking is therefore rapid but
seldom based on public support. This characteristic, combined with the
tradition of efficient implementation, sometimes creates problems that call
for the reversal of policy decisions. Although Korea's system is flexible in
the sense that decisions can be readily reversed, regular reversals can lead
to economic and political instability. For Korea, it will be important to
widen public participation and introduce a system of consensus building in its
economic policymaking.
73. Korea's past economic success has been related in large part to the
system of economic management discussed in this paper. Another important
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ingredient has been the political leadership's strong commitment to economic
growth. Since Florea's government is highly centralized, it could not have
brought about economic success without the top policymaker's commitment to
this goal. The system is currently facing a new test now that development
objectives have been expanded. In the past, the political leadership was
committed simply to maximizing economic growth and did not pay much attention
to price stability, an equitable distribution of growth benefits, political
stability, and so on. Now it is committed to attaining more diverse
objectives. The question arises whether Korea's present system of economic
managment can continue to achieve economic success under such a
multidimensional commitment. If it can, despite a smaller political
commitment to growth, the system will have proved its true worth.
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Notes
1/ See Cole and Nam (1969) and Jones and Sakong (1980) for description of
the attempts to formulate a development plan in Korea during the 1950s.
2/ In addition to these ministries, the Seoul city government is treated as
a central government ministry in the sense that it is not subject to any
supervision by the Ministry of Rome Affairs but is under the direct
control of the prime minister's office, whereas all the other local
governments, including such special cities as Pusan, Taegue, and Inchon,
are subject to the direct supervision of the Home Ministry.
3/ The fourteen work groups for the Third Plan were actually called "working
subcommittees," which is a vice-ministerial committee for review and
coordination of plan and policy directions. The basic function and
organization of these working subcommittees were not much different from
those of the latter-day work groups.
4/ With the Fourth Plan, the Korea Development Institute began issuing a
discussion paper to facilitate the EPB's review and examination of
alternative goals, targets, and policy directions for the plan before it
prepares the guidelines.
5/ The term "sectoral plan" is used to indicate the plan for a particular
economic aspect or sector. It does not necessarily mean an irndustrial
sector plan, but could also indicate a macroeconomic plan, a population
plan, an external sector plan, a fiscal plan, and so on.
6/ At the time of the Fourth Plan, the main parts of the sector plans
approved by the Plan Deliberation Committee were presented at the public
conferences held at KDI mainly to disseminate the plan goals, targets,
and policy direction. Plan dissemination was replaced by the KDI
conference before the finalization of the Fifth Plan.
7/ Foreign consultants financed by UNDP funds and their work assignments
have been selected by the Korean government in collaboration with the
World Bank. This collaboration has not only facilitated Bank review of
Korean plans, but has also enhanced the international reputation of
Korean planning.
8/ See Section VI for the organization and function of the Economic
Ministers Consultation Meeting, which is different from the Economic
Ministers Meeting.
9/ Bong Kun-Kange (1982) points out that more than 90 percent of the
economic and social development projects of the Fifth Plan could be
included in the approved budget for 1982, since the fiscal plan is
consistent with the Fifth Plan.
- 79 -
10/ Included are the ministers of the EPB (concurrently deputy prime
minister), Finance, Commerce and Industry, Agriculture and Fisheries,
Health ar,Ad Soeia1 Affairs. Labor Construction, Transportation,
Communications, and Energy and Resources.
11/ Many EPB officials suggest that the deputy prime minister's capacity to
coordinate ministerial policies through consultation really depends on
his personal character and whether he enjoys the confidence of the
president, although his knowledge of economics, as well as the
understanding of related policy issues, may be of some help.
12/ The measure taken on June 28 drastically reduced the interest rates of
financial institutions, while that announced on July 3 was introduced to
enforce the system of identifying financial asset holders' real names.
The National Assembly has, however, postponed the latter system to 1986.
13/ See Myrdal 1968, pp. 895-900. Myrdal indeed used the term "strong state"
as an antonym of "soft state."
14 Chungang Ilbo (daily newpaper), July 20, 1982.
15/ Jones and Sakong (1980) (p. 83) explain that "field manipulation either
expands the perceived opportunity set (field manipulation), or alters
expected payoffs from particular courses of action (parameter
manipulation)," whereas "command reduces the feasible opportunity set,
assuming there is sufficient compulsion to make it operable."
16/ In 1970, a Planning Coordination Committee was set up at the Prime
Minister's Office to deliberate on matters related to the coordination
and implementation of the annual management plan. The committee was
abolished in 1981, together with the Office of Planning Coordination.
17/ For instance, see EPB, The Current Status and Direction of the
Performance Evaluation and Analysis System, August 1982 (Processed, in
Korean).
18/ Fiscal settlements and general auditing can be considered part of the
performance evaluation system. These are not discussed in this section,
since its main objective is to check the misuse of government funds in an
accounting sense rather than to monitor and evaluate the performance of
any project.
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